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ABSTRACT—The Clean Air Act is often heralded as a paragon of 
cooperative federalism. The Act’s approach to vehicle emissions regulation 
in particular prescribes a unique partnership between the federal government 
and the state of California: while all states are bound by federally mandated 
vehicle emissions requirements, California may set more stringent standards 
in recognition of its historic role on the leading edge of environmental 
protection. However, in August 2018, the Environmental Protection Agency 
proposed not only to roll back the national emissions regulations, but also to 
revoke California’s ability to set more stringent standards, which include 
limits on greenhouse gas emissions and zero-emissions vehicle mandates. 
This revocation, finalized in September 2019, sparked legal challenges and 
debate on the role of states in environmental protection. 
The Supreme Court’s recent expansion of the anticommandeering 
doctrine in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association may signal 
increased constraints on federal power over states, which in turn may shed 
light on the permissibility of the EPA’s action to revoke California’s 
enhanced regulatory ability. This Note assesses the impact of Murphy on the 
distinction between permissible preemption and impermissible 
commandeering of state regulation, then applies that distinction to the 
vehicle emissions context. Ultimately, this Note argues that Congress and 
the courts should recognize the value of state involvement in environmental 
regulation and be wary of discarding the current dual-regulator system for 
vehicle emissions, owing to both policy and federalism concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the midst of World War II, residents of Los Angeles awoke one 
morning in July 1943 to a thick, eye-watering, and nose-burning fog, and 
initially believed it to be a Japanese chemical attack.1 It would take nearly a 
decade for scientists to discover that the culprit was actually automobile 
traffic, worsened by the heavy population influx to Los Angeles during the 
war.2 Dr. Arie Haagen-Smit, a chemist and professor at the California 
Institute of Technology, published the first study linking vehicle emissions 
and smog in 1950, which prompted California to pass the first vehicle 
emissions standards in the nation in 1961.3 
When Congress enacted the first federal legislation concerning vehicle 
emissions in 1967, it acknowledged California’s pioneering efforts and 
 
 1 CHIP JACOBS & WILLIAM J. KELLY, SMOGTOWN: THE LUNG-BURNING HISTORY OF POLLUTION IN 
LOS ANGELES 13–14 (2008). 
 2 Id. at 30–31, 86–87; David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism when Numbers Matter More 
than Size, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 252 (2014) (noting that by the end of the 1940s, Los 
Angeles had 50% more vehicles than New York City). 
 3 Adelman, supra note 2, at 252–53; see also A. J. Haagen-Smit, Chemistry and Physiology of Los 
Angeles Smog, 44 INDUS. & ENG’G CHEMISTRY 1342 (1952); A. J. Haagen-Smit, The Air Pollution 
Problem in Los Angeles, 14 ENG’G & SCI. 7 (1950). 
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established a waiver provision that could exempt California’s more stringent 
air pollution standards from otherwise being preempted by the federal 
regulations.4 Ever since then, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has granted waivers to California that permit stronger state regulation.5 But 
in August 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to freeze federal 
emissions standards and revoke the preemption waiver, valid through 2025, 
that permits California, and other states derivatively,6 to set higher emissions 
standards than the federal requirement.7 In September 2019, the 
Administration published part one of this Rule in final form, which revokes 
California’s preemption waiver effective November 2019 and adds 
regulatory text making it explicit that California’s standards are henceforth 
preempted.8  
This “Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule” has faced 
criticism along several fronts: environmental advocates have argued that the 
rollback threatens public health, air quality, and the environment;9 
 
 4 See Jeffrey Fromson, A History of Federal Air Pollution Control, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 516, 535–36 
(1969) (noting that California advocated to maintain its standards both because its smog problem 
warranted special attention and because strict federal preemption conflicted with the principle that states 
bore primary responsibility over air pollution). Much like the Clean Air Act does today, the Air Quality 
Act of 1967 permitted the implementing agency to waive the preemption of state regulation for any state 
that had adopted vehicle emissions limits prior to March 30, 1966—which only California had done, and 
thus, only California qualified for the waiver. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, §§ 208(a)–
(b), 81 Stat. 485, 500; Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 281, 292–93 (2003); see also infra Part II.A. 
 5 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 568 (7th 
ed. 2013). The EPA has never fully denied a waiver, but it has delayed a decision, occasionally partly 
denied a waiver, and once rejected a waiver, but later withdrew the rejection and granted the waiver. See 
Vicki Arroyo et al., New Strategies for Reducing Transportation Emissions and Preparing for Climate 
Impacts, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919, 924 n.21 (2017); Carlson, supra note 4, at 293. 
 6 Per a 1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act, any state is permitted to adopt California’s emissions 
limits in place of the federal standards. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 177, 
91 Stat. 685, 750; see also infra notes 163–166 and accompanying text. 
 7 SAFE Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 42986, 42999 (Aug. 24, 2018); see also NHTSA and EPA Proposed SAFE 
Vehicle Rule Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100V26O.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASW5-L4Y8]. 
 8 SAFE Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified 
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533). The Administration split the SAFE Rule into two parts: Part One, the One 
National Program, withdraws California’s waiver and adds regulatory text clarifying that state programs 
limiting vehicle emissions are preempted; as of October 2019, Part Two, which sets new federal emissions 
standards, will be published as a final rule “in the near future.” Id. at 51310. Specifically, this Final Rule 
revokes a waiver that EPA granted to California in 2013 which permitted California’s more stringent 
standards under the state’s greenhouse gas emissions program and zero-emissions vehicle mandate. Id.; 
see also infra notes 180, 190 and accompanying text. 
 9 See Kate Larsen et al., Sizing Up a Potential Fuel Economy Standards Freeze, RHODIUM  
GRP. (May 3, 2018), https://rhg.com/research/sizing-up-a-potential-fuel-economy-standards-freeze/ 
[https://perma.cc/4FKR-TJRU]. 
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economists have asserted that the Rule will be costly to consumers10 and that 
its cost–benefit analysis is flawed, with dubious calculations and 
unsupported assumptions;11 and the automobile industry has cautioned that 
the SAFE Rule threatens jobs and increases regulatory uncertainty.12 In 
addition, a coalition of states has brought two rounds of legal action to 
invalidate the SAFE Rule, first challenging the draft rule in May 201813 and 
second challenging the Final Rule in September 2019.14 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed the first petitions for review 
of the draft rule, concluding that the EPA’s draft rule did not constitute 
judicially reviewable “final action.”15 The second suit, however, which 
alleges that part one of the Final Rule (revoking California’s waiver) violates 
rulemaking procedures and exceeds agency authority, has just begun.16 
Beyond the legal and policy debate, the revocation of California’s 
preemption waiver forces a broader conversation about the role of states in 
environmental protection. Should the federal government deny California its 
ability to innovate and set standards that more closely match the desires of 
its constituency—a privilege the state has enjoyed for the last fifty years? 
Alternatively, should California be allowed to act on equal footing with the 
 
 10 Trevor Houser et al., The Biggest Climate Rollback Yet?, RHODIUM GRP. (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://rhg.com/research/the-biggest-climate-rollback-yet/ [https://perma.cc/6UHQ-H2UU] (projecting 
that freezing standards will cost consumers an additional $193 billion to $236 billion between now and 
2035 in oil costs); see also TYLER COMINGS ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., FUELING SAVINGS: 
HIGHER FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS RESULT IN BIG SAVINGS FOR CONSUMERS 3 (2016), https:// 
advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Fueling-Savings-Consumer-Savings-from-
CAFE-2025-Final-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFW5-DLFL] (estimating savings of at least $3,200 per 
vehicle that complies with the heightened emissions standards the Administration proposes to revoke). 
 11 See, e.g., BETHANY DAVIS NOLL ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, ANALYZING  
EPA’S VEHICLE-EMISSIONS DECISIONS: WHY WITHDRAWING THE 2022–2025 STANDARDS IS 
ECONOMICALLY FLAWED 5–6 (2018), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Analyzing_EPAs_ 
Fuel-Efficiency_Decisions_Policy_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/27A3-MH8A]; Antonio M. Bento et al., 
Flawed Analyses of U.S. Auto Fuel Economy Standards, 362 SCI. 1119, 1119–20 (2018). 
 12 See, e.g., Timothy Cama, Automakers Fight Trump’s Auto Emissions Rollback, HILL (Oct. 29, 
2018, 5:21 P.M.), https://thehill.com/policy/transportation/automobiles/413729-automakers-fight-
trumps-auto-emissions-rollback [https://perma.cc/TRR5-5JU7] (describing how major automakers filed 
comments expressing concern that the Rule is detrimental to consumers, society and American 
competitiveness and invites litigation and regulatory uncertainty); Brian Palmer, Fuel Efficiency 
Standards Don’t Just Help Curb Climate Change, They Also Create Jobs, NRDC (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/fuel-efficiency-standards-dont-just-help-curb-climate-change-they-also-
create-jobs [https://perma.cc/KA3M-BNNM] (showing that by the Administration’s own estimates, the 
SAFE Rule will cost the economy nearly sixty thousand jobs by 2030). 
 13 California v. EPA, 940 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 14 Complaint, California v. Chao, No. 19-cv-02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019). 
 15 California, 940 F.3d, at 1353. If an agency action is not “final,” federal courts lack jurisdiction to 
hear an administrative challenge. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 873 F.3d 
946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 16 Complaint, California v. Chao, supra note 14.  
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EPA and require national manufacturers to comply with a more stringent 
state-specific requirement? Scholars have debated the normative arguments 
in favor of and against greater state autonomy in environmental regulation.17 
But the withdrawal of California’s unique waiver also raises constitutional 
questions and federalism concerns, particularly in light of the Court’s recent 
anticommandeering jurisprudence. As of October 2019, however, no one has 
considered whether the revocation is an affront to federalism and to the 
anticommandeering principle in particular.18 
The Clean Air Act directs the EPA to set national vehicle emissions 
standards and expressly prohibits any state regulation of vehicle emissions,19 
thereby setting both a floor and a ceiling (a form of preemption dubbed 
“unitary federal choice”).20 Yet the Act contains a waiver of preemption 
directed at California alone, which allows the state to set more stringent 
emissions standards, thereby imposing only a regulatory floor, and no 
ceiling, in that state.21 
At the time of the Act’s passage in 1970, the inclusion of a waiver was 
driven by a recognition of California’s unique challenges and pioneering 
efforts on vehicular air pollution rather than by any constitutional or 
federalism concerns.22 Since then, however, the Supreme Court has 
increasingly recognized the Tenth Amendment as a check on federal power 
and has refined the anticommandeering doctrine, under which Congress may 
not commandeer state legislative or administrative functions.23 While 
 
 17 See infra Part III.C. 
 18 Although the American Constitution Society has noted in a policy brief that the waiver revocation 
contradicts federalism principles, the authors did not discuss the Court’s federalism jurisprudence or the 
anticommandeering rule. ANN E. CARLSON ET AL., AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, SHIFTING GEARS: THE  
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S REVERSAL ON CALIFORNIA’S CLEAN AIR ACT WAIVER 7–11 (2019), 
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CA-Car-Standards-IB-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7LTJ-HLGM]. 
 19 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521(a)(1), 7543(a) (2012). 
 20 Coined by Professor William Buzbee, “unitary federal choice” describes forms of ceiling 
preemption that completely displace any other regulatory actors. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical 
Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1568–69 
(2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, Asymmetrial Regulation]; William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: 
Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 147 (2007) 
[hereinafter Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise]; see also infra Part I.B. 
 21 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). California is the only state that qualifies for a waiver. See supra note 4; see 
also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 525 
(2d Cir. 1994) (describing history of the Clean Air Act and how “California was excepted from 
preemption as the only state regulating auto emissions ‘prior to March 30, 1966’”). 
 22 Deborah Keeth, The California Climate Law: A State’s Cutting-Edge Efforts to Achieve Clean Air, 
30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 715, 723 (2003); see also James R. May, Of Happy Incidents, Climate, Federalism, 
and Preemption, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 465, 482 (2008). 
 23 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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limiting Congress’s ability to regulate state governments directly, the Court 
nonetheless recognized that Congress could accomplish similar ends through 
preemption, wherein Congress directly regulates private actors and preempts 
contrary state law.24 Under this dichotomy, valid preemptive schemes merely 
instructed states to forbear from acting, while laws that affirmatively 
instructed states to act were invalid as forms of commandeering.25 
The division between preemption and commandeering continued 
undisturbed until the Supreme Court’s ruling in Murphy v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association in May 2018.26 In Murphy, the Court clarified 
that the anticommandeering doctrine is implicated not only when Congress 
affirmatively commands that states enact legislation or adopt federal 
programs, but also when Congress prohibits states from enacting laws. “[I]n 
either event,” wrote Justice Alito for the majority, “[t]he basic principle—
that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies.”27 
Thus, in its attempt to clarify the anticommandeering doctrine, Murphy may 
have blurred the line between valid federal preemption and unconstitutional 
commandeering. 
Environmental regulations like the Clean Air Act involve complex 
cooperative federalism programs that reach deep into local policy and 
therefore must navigate through a maze of commandeering prohibitions and 
available preemption alternatives.28 Depending on how Murphy shifts the 
line between preemption and commandeering, the case may bear on the 
 
 24 See New York, 505 U.S. at 166–68. 
 25 See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State 
Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1054 (1995) (stating that the 
commandeering analysis “rests on an action/inaction distinction,” in which “Congress may compel state 
inaction by limiting the subject matters over which states can regulate, yet Congress may not compel any 
affirmative regulatory action within the remaining realm of state authority”); see also Neil S. Siegel, 
Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1639–40 
(2006). 
 26 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 27 Id. at 1478. 
 28 Cooperative federalism describes a “system of shared authority between the federal and state 
governments” to regulate private activity. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: 
The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1811 
(2008); see also Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. 
L. REV. 1516, 1532–33 (1995) (“Cooperative federalism holds the promise of allowing the states 
continued primacy and flexibility in their traditional realms of protecting public health and welfare, while 
ensuring that protections for all citizens meet minimum federal standards. In theory, the system allows 
states to experiment and innovate, but not to sacrifice public health and welfare in a bidding war to attract 
industry.”). 
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validity of the EPA’s revocation of California’s ability to set more stringent 
emissions standards—a power that California insists on maintaining.29 
This Note analyzes the line between commandeering and preemption 
after Murphy and examines how the current caselaw affects the Clean Air 
Act’s ceiling preemption and the California waiver. Ultimately, this review 
concludes that the revocation of California’s waiver does not implicate the 
anticommandeering doctrine under the most straightforward reading of 
Murphy. However, this Note critiques Murphy’s clarified distinction 
between preemption and commandeering as overly formalistic and too 
imprecise an instrument to account for complex cooperative federalism 
schemes like the vehicle emissions program. In any case, there are strong 
normative arguments for maintaining state participation in vehicle emissions 
regulation, particularly at a time when reducing greenhouse gas emissions is 
critical30 and the EPA has been unwilling and unable to act sufficiently to 
address the problem.31 
 
 29 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., STAFF REPORT: INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS 2–3 (2018), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2018/leviii2018/leviiiisor.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W85-X95A] (noting 
California’s pressing “responsibilities as an independent co-regulator” for one third of the domestic light-
duty vehicle industry and proposing amendments that “will prevent any federal weakening” from 
impacting California through 2025). 
 30 Greenhouse gases (GHGs), which include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated 
gases, trap heat in the atmosphere by absorbing outgoing thermal radiation that would otherwise escape 
back into space, warming the planet. Overview of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ 
ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases [https://perma.cc/49X4-J5R6]. These gases have increased 
significantly in concentration—by approximately 44%—since the Industrial Revolution as a result of 
fossil fuel combustion for energy. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, 
at ES-9–ES-10 (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-01/documents/2018_complete_ 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JDV-NQ5Q]. Nearly one-fifth of the GHG emissions in the United States 
come from fueling passenger cars and light-duty trucks, which emit twenty-four pounds of GHGs for 
every gallon of gasoline. Car Emissions & Global Warming, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https:// 
www.ucsusa.org/clean-vehicles/car-emissions-and-global-warming [https://perma.cc/N466-9R5B]; see 
also Vehicle Efficiency and Emissions Standards, ENVTL. & ENERGY STUDY INST. (Aug. 2015), 
https://www.eesi.org/files/FactSheet_Vehicle_Emissions_081815.pdf [https://perma.cc/B65X-AQS7]. 
 A recent report by the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change found that the 
globe will unavoidably warm 1.5 degrees Celsius by 2040, causing frightening and dangerous 
consequences for food security, the prevalence and intensity of natural disasters, and ecosystem integrity. 
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, at 10–11 (2018), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4SYA-AFUL]. To limit warming beyond 1.5 degrees will require global anthropogenic 
carbon dioxide emissions to fall 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 and achieve net zero by around 2050, 
which is unachievable without “rapid and far reaching transitions” in areas including transport, such as 
reducing vehicle emissions. See id. at 15, 17. 
 31 See Elizabeth Bomberg, Environmental Politics in the Trump Era: An Early Assessment, 
26 ENVTL. POL. 956, 956–57 (2017) (discussing the Trump Administration’s efforts to dismantle 
environmental protection policies); Carlson, supra note 4, at 311 (noting California’s critical role in 
reducing emissions due to inaction at the federal level); Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change at EPA, 
64 FLA. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2012) (concluding that the EPA delayed, cut back, and stagnated on its 
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This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the doctrines of 
anticommandeering and preemption, discusses the reasoning in Murphy, and 
analyzes how Murphy impacts the anticommandeering and preemption 
doctrines. Part II describes the regulatory landscape governing vehicle 
emissions, including the Clean Air Act, California’s unique position, and the 
Trump Administration’s SAFE Rule. With the preceding Parts as a 
foundation, Part III applies the principles from Murphy to the Clean Air 
Act’s preemption of state regulation and the California waiver and uses the 
current federal and state struggle over vehicle emissions regulation to 
examine whether Murphy’s distinction between preemption and 
commandeering is coherent. Lastly, Part III concludes with an argument for 
preserving California’s function as a laboratory of innovation. 
I. ANTICOMMANDEERING, PREEMPTION, AND MURPHY 
Both the anticommandeering and preemption doctrines shape the 
division of power between federal and state governments. Traditionally, the 
anticommandeering doctrine prevented Congress from requiring state 
legislatures or executives to affirmatively act according to federal 
instruction. Preemption, on the other hand, was Congress’s permissible way 
of completely eliminating state legislative authority in areas where Congress 
had chosen to act exclusively. Then, in 2018, the Supreme Court in Murphy 
stated that both doctrines—anticommandeering and preemption—govern the 
boundaries of permissible laws when Congress prohibits states from 
legislating in certain areas. This Part will introduce the two doctrines, 
describe Murphy’s ruling, and assess how Murphy impacts the difference 
between preemption and commandeering. 
A. Anticommandeering: Federal Power May Not Compel State Action 
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution reminds Congress that its 
powers are limited and serves as a textual basis to invalidate federal laws that 
invade “the province of state sovereignty.”32 The Articles of Confederation 
taught the Framers that “using the States as the instruments of federal 
governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federal-state conflict,” 
and “[p]reservation of the States as independent political entities [became] 
 
regulatory initiatives on greenhouse gases). See generally Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: 
Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 301 
(1999) (discussing agency failures to act in environmental regulation broadly). 
 32 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
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the price of union.”33 In response, the Constitution established a system of 
dual sovereignty, where federal and state governments exercise concurrent 
authority to regulate individuals, but Congress may neither regulate states 
directly nor instruct states how to govern.34 This system ensures that the 
federal and state political capacities are “each protected from incursion by 
the other,” and that each has “its own direct relationship, its own privity, its 
own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are 
governed by it.”35 
To monitor this careful balance, courts assess whether the enactment of 
federal laws exceeds Congress’s powers under Article I of the Constitution 
and encroaches on a protected area of state sovereignty.36 While the 
prevalence of the Tenth Amendment as a limit has varied over time, the 
underlying aims of invoking it remain fairly consistent: protecting the 
structure of federalism, maintaining state sovereign rights and traditional 
functions, ensuring political accountability, safeguarding individual and 
political liberties, and permitting states to act as laboratories of democracy.37 
Judicial enforcement of the Tenth Amendment to constrain Congress 
has ebbed and flowed over time. In 1976, the Supreme Court broke forty 
years of upholding economic legislation against claims of encroachment into 
state sovereignty when it struck down provisions of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act in National League of Cities v. Usery.38 The Court held that while 
Congress could set minimum wage and maximum hour limits for private 
employers, it could not regulate states as public employers, for this amounted 
to direct federal regulation of states as sovereign governments.39 The Tenth 
Amendment, the Court ruled, protected states’ “traditional governmental 
functions” from federal encroachment, and prohibited federal regulations 
that addressed matters involving indisputable “attribute[s] of state 
sovereignty.”40 
 
 33 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
 34 See New York, 505 U.S. at 161–66 (discussing the history of the anticommandeering doctrine). 
 35 Printz, 521 U.S. at 920 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 36 See, e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (finding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
exceeded Congress’s legislative authority). Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the authority to 
legislate for certain limited purposes. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 237–342 (4th ed. 2011). 
 37 See Siegel, supra note 25, at 1642–45, 1649–50. 
 38 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 39 Id. at 852. 
 40 Id. at 845, 852. 
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The question of what this ruling meant for federal and state cooperation 
on environmental regulation arose immediately. Prior to the Court’s 
pronouncement in National League of Cities, four states had filed lawsuits 
challenging EPA regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act that 
required states to pass and enforce certain laws on pollution control when the 
states failed to submit adequate plans on their own.41 Various circuits struck 
down the regulations on statutory grounds for exceeding the EPA 
Administrator’s mandate in the Clean Air Act, but also noted that if the 
Administrator did indeed have such power, it would contravene the Tenth 
Amendment by impermissibly infringing on state sovereignty.42 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard the consolidated cases in 1977 
after National League of Cities, but by then, the EPA Administrator 
conceded that the regulations would be invalid unless they eliminated the 
mandate that states adopt certain laws.43 Accordingly, the Court vacated the 
lower judgments but declined to prospectively rule on the constitutionality 
of the EPA’s yet-to-be-promulgated revised regulations.44 Thus, the Court 
did not answer whether the Tenth Amendment would be as protective of state 
sovereignty in environmental regulation as it was in labor regulation. 
The Court backtracked in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, overruling National League of Cities after finding that it was too 
unworkable for courts to determine what constituted a “traditional 
governmental function” of state and local governments that the federal 
government could not touch.45 Instead, the Court advised that state interests 
were better protected by procedural safeguards in the structure of the federal 
system itself than by judicially created limits.46  
While Garcia is still good law, the Court in the 1990s returned to 
federalism constraints in the Tenth Amendment via the anticommandeering 
 
 41 These cases were Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), Arizona v. EPA, 521 F.2d 825 (9th 
Cir. 1975), Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), and Virginia ex rel. State Air Pollution 
Control Board v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and were all vacated by EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 
99 (1977). For further information on these cases and how scholars of the day predicted National League 
of Cities would impact them, see Arlan Gerald Wine, Enforcement Controversy Under the Clean Air Act: 
State Sovereignty and the Commerce Clause, 8 TRANSP. L.J. 383, 383–84, 397–400 (1976). 
 42 Wine, supra note 41, at 383, 387–88, 392–94 (citations omitted). 
 43 Brown, 431 U.S. at 103. 
 44 Id. at 103–04. 
 45 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (“[T]he attempt to draw the 
boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is not only 
unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very 
federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest.”). 
 46 Id. at 552. The Court pointed to the equal representation of states in the Senate and states’ influence 
over the Presidency and House of Representatives by controlling electoral qualifications as examples of 
how the federal structure itself protected state interests. Id. at 550–52. 
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doctrine in what has been called a “federalist revival.”47 The 
anticommandeering doctrine represents the principle that the federal 
government may not command state legislatures to enact laws or regulations, 
nor may it command state executive officials to administer federal 
programs.48  
In New York v. United States, the Court invalidated a federal provision 
that required state governments to either take title to radioactive waste or 
regulate it pursuant to Congress’s instructions.49 The Court reasoned that 
either option “would ‘commandeer’ state governments into the service of 
federal regulatory purposes,” and therefore, the provision impermissibly 
intruded across the “constitutional line separating state and federal 
authority.”50 Importantly, however, the Court noted that the Constitution 
permitted Congress to achieve similar ends through preemption or by 
offering states incentives to encourage voluntary cooperation.51 
If New York stood for the rule that Congress may not commandeer a 
state’s legislative process, the Court’s next anticommandeering case, Printz 
v. United States, ruled that Congress may not “circumvent that prohibition” 
by commandeering state officials directly.52 The provision of the act at issue 
required state law enforcement officials to conduct background checks for a 
federal handgun program. This amounted to federal conscription of state 
officials to administer a federal regulatory scheme, which violated state 
sovereignty and dual federalism.53 As the Court stated, “[i]t is the very 
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends.”54 
In sum, the anticommandeering doctrine grew to represent the principle 
that the Tenth Amendment protects some sphere of state sovereignty and 
 
 47 Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 2180, 2181 (1998) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995); and New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) as evidence that the “constitutional law of federalism-based constraints on 
the federal government has risen phoenix-like from the ashes of post-New Deal enthusiasm for the 
exercise of national power”). 
 48 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
 49 New York, 505 U.S. at 175–76 . 
 50 Id. at 175, 177. 
 51 Id. at 188. 
 52 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
 53 Id. at 922–23. Dual federalism describes the theory that the federal government and state 
governments both have sovereign power over citizens, with separate and distinct spheres of authority. See 
Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2005); see 
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 252–53 (explaining dual federalism and the three doctrines it 
embodies). But see Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2133, 2133–35 (2006) (arguing that the U.S. government does not actually operate on the theory 
of dual federalism; rather, “overlap of national and state activities is ubiquitous”). 
 54 Printz, 521 U.S. at 932. 
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prohibits the federal government from commanding affirmative action by 
state legislatures or executives. 
B. Preemption: Federal Power May Prohibit Contrary State Policy 
While Congress may not affirmatively commandeer states, it can pass 
federal statutes per Article I of the Constitution and include provisions that 
bar states from enacting conflicting laws—referred to as preemption of state 
legislation.55 Thus far, the Court has treated preemption as an entirely 
permissible alternative to commandeering, allowing Congress to respond to 
invalidated commandeering legislation with broader preemptive schemes.56 
This Section introduces the constitutional basis for preemption and the 
various forms it can take. 
The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause,57 which 
instructs that when courts are faced with a conflict between a valid federal 
law and a contrary state or local law, federal law shall prevail.58 The 
preemption power is a derivative of the supremacy of federal law, permitting 
Congress to anticipatorily prohibit state or local laws that would be at odds 
with valid exercises of federal power.59 
In a preemption analysis, the primary question is whether Congress in 
fact intended to exercise its preemptive power.60 The Court has recognized 
three primary ways in which Congress can demonstrate its intent to 
preempt—express, conflict, and field preemption—but all three involve 
incompatibility between state and federal law.61 
“Express preemption” occurs when a federal law contains an explicit 
provision that withdraws certain authority from states.62 The Court has noted 
 
 55 U.S. CONST. art. I; see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
767, 771 (1994); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 237–342 (providing a primer on Congress’s 
legislative powers under Article I). 
 56 Siegel, supra note 25, at 1646–47. 
 57 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 
(1982). 
 58 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260 (2000). 
 59 See id. at 251–52 (“Under the Supremacy Clause, any obligation to disregard state law flows 
entirely from the obligation to follow federal law.”); see also Gardbaum, supra note 55, at 771 (“Whereas 
supremacy resolves a conflict resulting from the exercise by two or more entities of their concurrent 
powers, preemption implies that one entity (the federal) has attained exclusive power on the issue.”). 
 60 See Gardbaum, supra note 55, at 767. 
 61 The Court has, at times, defined these categories with rigidity, see, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990), but scholars have critiqued the Court as being unable to maintain clear 
distinctions. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1177 (3d ed. 2000); Nelson, 
supra note 58, at 262. Recently the Court has agreed. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018) (“Our cases have identified three different types of preemption—‘conflict,’ 
‘express,’ and ‘field’ []—but all of them work in the same way.”). 
 62 Nelson, supra note 58, at 226. 
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that Congress need not use special words when drafting a preemption 
provision—all that matters is Congress’s intent to preempt.63 But the Court 
has also articulated a broad presumption against preemption and favored a 
narrow reading of express preemption provisions, particularly those that 
involve the states’ traditional powers over health, safety, and welfare.64 
When applying a statute’s express preemption provision, courts consider  
(a) the statutory meaning and whether it covers the state action at issue and 
(b) whether the Constitution permits Congress to preempt states in such a 
manner.65 
Even in the absence of an express preemption provision, state law is 
preempted if it actually conflicts with a federal law; this is labeled “conflict 
preemption.” Conflict preemption can arise when it is impossible to comply 
with both federal and state laws, or when state law “stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”66 
Finally, courts find “field preemption” in two situations: first, when a 
scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive that courts reasonably infer that 
Congress left “no room for supplementary state legislation”;67 and second, 
when the federal law addresses “a field in which the federal interest is so 
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement 
of state laws on the same subject.”68 Even in field and conflict preemption, 
courts must still consider (a) the scope of the implicit preemption and (b) 
whether Congress may constitutionally exercise such power.69 
Not all preemption schemes completely displace state action; some 
forms permit state regulatory participation. First, under “conditional 
preemption,” states are given a choice to either pass state regulations 
according to federal directives (a clear case of commandeering on its own) 
or to be preempted outright by federal laws.70 While Congress may not 
directly commandeer the states, it can condition its decision to not fully 
preempt state laws upon securing the states’ agreement to be 
 
 63 Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 137 S. Ct. 1190, 1199 (2017). 
 64 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992). 
 65 Nelson, supra note 58, at 226–27. 
 66 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 
(1983) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 67 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cty., 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986). 
 68 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 
458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)). 
 69 Nelson, supra note 58, at 227. 
 70 Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 663, 668 (2001). 
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commandeered.71 By offering states a choice between preemption or 
commandeering as part of a program of cooperative federalism, Congress 
escapes the commandeering prohibition.72 
Alternatively, many preemption schemes in the regulatory context set 
only a floor or a ceiling, permitting states to regulate so long as the state 
regulation fits within that federally mandated range.73 In “floor preemption,” 
Congress sets a federal minimum, and preempts state regulations that fall 
below it.74 Many environmental laws follow this model of cooperative 
federalism by permitting states to tailor their environmental standards to 
local needs with more stringent requirements, as long as the federal 
minimum is met.75 For example, the Clean Water Act directs the EPA to 
establish federal standards for acceptable levels of pollution, but sets only 
the minimum level of stringency.76 States may adopt additional pollution 
standards that are not “less stringent” than the federal standards.77 
Conversely, when Congress sets a standard and prohibits states from 
applying more stringent regulation, it imposes “ceiling preemption.”78 This 
often takes the form of a unitary federal choice, which sets both a floor and 
ceiling and traditionally was used primarily in product design and 
engineering standards.79 For example, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act sets federal product labeling requirements and prohibits 
states from imposing any additional label requirements that go beyond the 
federal mandate.80 As another example, the Court has struck down state laws 
 
 71 Siegel, supra note 25, at 1676. 
 72 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (“[W]here Congress has the authority 
to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to offer 
States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted 
by federal regulation.”). 
 73 Siegel, supra note 25, at 1630 n.2. 
 74 Id. at 1678. 
 75 Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 
90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 384 (2005); see also Babich, supra note 28, at 1534 (“The essence of cooperative 
federalism is that states take primary responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining 
the freedom to apply their own, more stringent standards.”). 
 76 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(3) (2012); see also Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1567. 
 77 33 U.S.C. § 1370; see also Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1567. Similar 
provisions exist in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012), and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, id. §§ 6926(b), 6929. 
 78 Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1569. 
 79 See id. at 1568; Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise, supra note 20, at 148. Professor Buzbee notes that 
pure ceiling preemption would involve a federal law that merely permits state regulation up to a certain 
point, allowing states to choose how much to regulate as long as they regulate below a threshold of 
maximum regulation. This would allow some regulatory choices for states, unlike in a unitary federal 
choice form of ceiling preemption. This “true ceiling” would be the converse of a regulatory floor, but, 
per Buzbee, no such true ceilings exist in U.S. law. See id. at 147. 
 80 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b); see also Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1562. 
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that impose supplemental warning label requirements on pharmaceuticals 
that go beyond the Food and Drug Administration’s requirements.81 In the 
last several decades, the prevalence of ceiling preemption has grown 
significantly in environmental statutes, including the Clean Air Act.82 
C. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: 
Anticommandeering and Preemption Doctrines Intersect? 
In Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Court struck 
down another method83 of circumventing the commandeering prohibition. 
Murphy clarified that the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering rule 
applies not only when Congress compels states to affirmatively enact federal 
programs but also when Congress mandates that states forbear from enacting 
state regulation.84 In other words, the Court stated that the Tenth Amendment 
limits Congress’s ability to command what states may not do, in addition to 
constraining Congress’s direction of what states must do. 
At issue in Murphy was the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection 
Act (PASPA), a law enacted in 1992 which made it “unlawful for a 
governmental entity”85 to “authorize by law or compact . . . a lottery, 
sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme” based on 
“competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate” 
(the anti-authorization provision).86 A second provision made it unlawful for 
“a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote” such sports gambling 
schemes “pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity.”87 
PASPA did not make sports gambling a federal crime, but it did permit civil 
actions to enjoin individuals or government entities that violated either 
provision.88 
In 2011, New Jersey constituents approved a state constitutional 
amendment that permitted the legislature to authorize sports gambling at 
casinos and racetracks, revising an 1897 constitutional amendment that 
 
 81 See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 476 (2013). 
 82 See Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1568; Brian T. Burgess, Note, Limiting 
Preemption in Environmental Law: An Analysis of the Cost-Externalization Argument and California 
Assembly Bill 1493, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 266 (2009). 
 83 Two decades earlier, the Court clarified that Congress cannot circumvent New York’s prohibition 
on commandeering state legislatures by directly commandeering state executive officers instead. See 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); see also supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 84 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018). 
 85 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2000), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1485. PASPA defines a 
“governmental entity” to include a State or any of its political subdivisions. 28 U.S.C. § 3701(2). 
 86 Id. § 3702(1). This provision shall be referred to as the anti-authorization provision, which is the 
term used by the Court. 
 87 Id. § 3702(2). 
 88 Id. § 3703. 
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prohibited all forms of gambling.89 The state legislature responded with the 
Sports Wagering Law of 2012, which permitted state-licensed sports 
gambling at casinos and racetracks.90 The National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) and various professional sports leagues then sued to 
enjoin New Jersey’s new law on the grounds that it violated PASPA.91 In 
response, New Jersey argued that PASPA itself violated the 
anticommandeering principle by prohibiting the state from enacting any law 
legalizing sports gambling.92 
The district court agreed with the NCAA’s contention that the Tenth 
Amendment was only implicated when the federal government issued an 
affirmative command to act, rather than a prohibition on action, and found 
that PASPA’s anti-authorization provision was more akin to a “larger 
Congressional scheme controlling the area of sports wagering” that 
preempted state action.93 The Third Circuit affirmed on similar grounds, but 
did not interpret PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from merely repealing its 
ban on sports wagering,94 and the Supreme Court denied review.95 
The New Jersey legislature tried once more, this time taking the Third 
Circuit’s hint and only repealing provisions of state law that prohibited 
betting on sporting events at casinos and racetracks, rather than formally 
authorizing sports betting, as the prior law had attempted.96 The same 
plaintiffs challenged the new law, and the district court and Third Circuit 
again held that New Jersey’s law violated PASPA and denied New Jersey’s 
argument that PASPA impermissibly commandeered state legislatures.97 
Critical to the court’s assessment of the commandeering argument was the 
distinction between federally commanded action and inaction, and a finding 
that PASPA required only state inaction.98 The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, 
observed that “PASPA does not command states to take affirmative actions,” 
 
 89 N.J. CONST. art. IV, §§ VII(2)(D), (F); see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1469. 
 90 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A–2 (West 2012) (repealed 2014). 
 91 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 556 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d sub 
nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 92 Id. at 561. 
 93 Id. at 562, 570–71. 
 94 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 232 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated 
by Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 95 Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (denying certiorari). 
 96 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A–7 (West 2014) (repealed 2018). 
 97 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d Cir. 2016), rev’d sub 
nom. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 98 Id. (distinguishing PASPA from the facts in New York because PASPA “does not require states to 
take any action”). 
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and thus, the court’s prior reasoning “that PASPA does not commandeer the 
states remains unshaken.”99 
The Supreme Court granted review and reversed the Third Circuit, 
holding that PASPA’s anti-authorization provision did indeed violate the 
anticommandeering doctrine and could not be saved from unconstitutionality 
as a valid preemption provision.100 Writing for the 7-2 majority, Justice Alito 
described the anticommandeering doctrine as a simple recognition that 
Congress’s enumerated powers do not include the ability to issue direct 
orders to state governments.101 
Beginning with New York and Printz as foundations, the Court ruled 
that there is no difference between Congress compelling a state to enact 
legislation and prohibiting a state from enacting new laws—such a 
“distinction is empty,” and “[t]he basic principle—that Congress cannot 
issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event.”102 PASPA’s 
anti-authorization provision “unequivocally dictates what a state legislature 
may and may not do[,] . . . as if federal officers were installed in state 
legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators 
from voting on any offending proposals. A more direct affront to state 
sovereignty is not easy to imagine.”103 
The Court next considered the argument that PASPA’s anti-
authorization provision constituted a valid preemption scheme and so was 
not invalidated by the anticommandeering principle.104 Here, the Court 
articulated that preemption is valid only where “Congress enacts a law that 
imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors; a state law confers 
rights or imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal law; and therefore 
the federal law takes precedence and the state law is preempted.”105 PASPA’s 
anti-authorization provision, the Court concluded, neither conferred federal 
rights on private actors to engage in sports gambling, nor imposed federal 
restrictions on private actors—it only made it unlawful for states to authorize 
sports gambling regimes.106 Thus, the preemption analysis as set by Murphy 
hinges on the subject of the federal regulation: private actors or the state 
 
 99 Id. at 401. 
 100 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478, 1479, 1485 (2018). 
 101 Id. at 1476. Justice Breyer joined the majority opinion except for Part VI-B, on severability, 
because he disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that PASPA was inseverable. Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 102 Id. at 1478. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 1479. 
 105 Id. at 1480. 
 106 Id. at 1481. 
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itself. While PASPA’s second provision did regulate individuals directly,107 
the Court found PASPA to be inseverable and invalidated the Act.108 
In sum, Murphy expanded the Court’s anticommandeering 
jurisprudence to areas in which Congress instructs states to forbear from 
legislating—leaving scholars questioning how this impacts preemption. 
D. Murphy’s Impact on the Commandeering and Preemption Doctrines 
There is some doctrinal line between prohibitions of state regulation via 
preemption, which are permitted, and commandeering mandates, which are 
not, but this line is not always clear. As Professor Bulman-Pozen noted, 
“[t]he prohibition on commandeering follows from structural and normative 
considerations that also attend federal preemption of state law.”109 She 
continues that “distinct framings may make a given federal law appear 
merely to be prohibiting a conflicting state action (preemption) or instead to 
be coercing a state to undertake a certain activity (commandeering).”110 
Prior to Murphy, the Court’s opinions in New York and Printz suggested 
that the difference turns on whether Congress affirmatively compels state 
action (impermissible) versus merely requires that states refrain from 
enacting particular laws and regulations (permissible).111 Indeed, many 
scholars agreed with this distinction, and there has been little written to 
challenge the validity of such a bright line or argue normatively that the line 
is misplaced.112 In short, the dividing line separating commandeering and 
preemption was a distinction between compelled action and compelled 
inaction. 
The Court in Murphy obliterated this line by stating that such a 
“distinction is empty” and rejected the contention that “commandeering 
 
 107 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (2000); see supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 108 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482–84. 
 109 Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Essay, Preemption and Commandeering Without Congress, 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 2029, 2042 (2018). 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
188 (1992). 
 112 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, 
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 94–95 (“A requirement that state legislators enact a particular 
statute seems, somehow, to be more of an interference with state autonomy than a requirement that they 
refrain from enacting a particular statute. . . . In short, we believe that there is a good conceptual, 
interpretive, and normative case for construing the preemption/commandeering distinction as a distinction 
between inaction and action.”); Jackson, supra note 47, at 2201–02 (discussing the difference between 
preemption and commandeering as a difference of compelled inaction versus compelled action); R. Seth 
Davis, Note, Conditional Preemption, Commandeering, and the Values of Cooperative Federalism: An 
Analysis of Section 216 of EPAct, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 418 (2008) (describing courts’ 
commandeering analyses assuming that suspect laws include commands that require action by the state). 
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occurs ‘only when Congress goes beyond precluding state action and 
affirmatively commands it.’”113 Going forward, it matters not whether 
Congress commands affirmative state action or prohibits a state from 
legislating—in both cases, the anticommandeering rule applies.114 Murphy’s 
first doctrinal impact, thus, is its new definition of the anticommandeering 
doctrine as the “basic principle[] that Congress cannot issue direct orders to 
state legislatures,” which includes “laws that direct[] the States either to 
enact or to refrain from enacting a regulation of the conduct of activities 
occurring within their borders.”115 
Scholars were scattered on what Murphy means for the dividing line 
between preemption and commandeering, and what impact that has on 
various federal laws. The Court’s decision puzzled many who saw a direct 
conflict between its clarified rule against commandeering (that Congress 
cannot issue direct orders to state governments)116 and the traditional 
understanding of preemption.117 As Dean Vikram Amar remarked, “every 
congressional enactment that properly accomplishes federal preemption 
either explicitly or implicitly ‘direct[s] the States [] to . . . refrain from . . . 
regulation’ of some kind.”118 But Dean Amar went on to predict a tempered 
impact, suggesting that Murphy was neither a blundered one-off ruling nor 
an erosion of the long-standing doctrine of preemption.119 Rather, Dean 
Amar concluded that Murphy’s primary impact is on conditional preemption, 
requiring that the conditions placed upon states to avoid preemption be laid 
out explicitly and clearly.120 
Others were more troubled about Murphy’s impact. Several scholars 
contended that the same concerns of commandeering are likewise implicated 
in preemption, and warned that Murphy’s definition of “valid preemption 
 
 113 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 19). 
 114 See id. 
 115 Id. at 1478–79. 
 116 Id. at 1476. 
 117 See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, “Clarifying” Murphy’s Law: Did Something Go Wrong in 
Reconciling Commandeering and Conditional Preemption Doctrines?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 299; Daniel 
Hemel, Justice Alito, State Tax Hero?, MEDIUM (May 15, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source-
derived/justice-alito-state-tax-hero-333830d097ab [https://perma.cc/8EJL-FF48]; Jeff Schmitt, Murphy 
v. NCAA: Anti-Commandeering, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, FAC. 
LOUNGE (May 15, 2018, 09:32 AM), https://www.thefacultylounge.org/2018/05/murphy-v-ncaa-anti-
commandeering-prigg-v-pennsylvania-and-the-dormant-commerce-clause.html [https://perma.cc/J94N-
BWVZ]. 
 118 Amar, supra note 117, at 300 (quoting Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479). 
 119 See id. at 301. 
 120 See id. For background on conditional preemption, see supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.  
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provisions”121 might be too narrow and lead to invalidation of numerous 
preemption provisions.122 In the tax context, Professors Brian Galle and 
Daniel Hemel argued that Murphy threatens the constitutionality of upwards 
of 100 federal provisions that limit the states’ power to tax.123 Professor 
Matthew Melone also argued that Murphy’s outcome prohibits Congress’s 
ability to streamline state sales tax and use tax regimes for remote and digital 
sellers.124 In the immigration context, Professor Ilya Somin concurred with 
the Court’s conclusion that there is no difference between commandeering 
and prohibiting affirmative state laws, and argued that Murphy bolsters his 
argument that federal immigration legislation targeting sanctuary cities 
violates the anticommandeering rule.125 Professor Josh Blackman agreed, 
arguing that a provision of the Immigration Code which forbids states from 
enacting sanctuary laws that restrict any state official from sharing 
information with federal immigration authorities is facially unconstitutional 
after Murphy.126 Finally, Professor Sam Kamin added that Murphy likely 
limits federal power to restrict state marijuana legalization.127 
 
 121 Under Murphy, for a legal provision to qualify as a valid form of preemption, it must be “best 
read as one that regulates private actors,” meaning that it “imposes restrictions or confers rights on private 
actors.” Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479–80. 
 122 See, e.g., Matthew A. Melone, Murphy v. NCAA & South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.: The Court’s 
Anticommandeering Jurisprudence May Preclude Congressional Action with Respect to Sales Taxes on 
Internet Sales, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 413, 445 (2019) (“[T]he Court’s rather opaque reasoning with respect 
to the preemption versus anticommandeering issue casts doubt on the federal government’s ability to 
prohibit state action in a number of circumstances.”); Daniel Hemel, More on Murphy—And a Response 
to Critics, MEDIUM (May 16, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/more-on-murphy-
and-a-response-to-critics-471b35c75ecb [http://perma.cc/UP4N-H3MN]; see also Mark Brnovich, 
Betting on Federalism: Murphy v. NCAA and the Future of Sports Gambling, 2017–2018 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 247, 259–63 (2018) (discussing Murphy’s impacts on state taxation and immigration). 
 123 See Brian Galle, Murphy’s (Misguided) Law, MEDIUM (May 15, 2018), 
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/murphys-misguided-law-8c22889918e4 
[http://perma.cc/4PJS-9TZ5] (noting that Murphy jeopardizes the constitutionality of approximately 110 
federal provisions that limit state authority to tax); Hemel, supra note 117 (focusing on Murphy’s 
implications for immigration law and tax law); Hemel, supra note 122.  
 124 See Melone, supra note 122. 
 125 See Ilya Somin, Making Federalism Great Again: How the Trump Administration’s Attack on 
Sanctuary Cities Unintentionally Strengthened Judicial Protection for State Autonomy, 97 TEX. L. REV. 
1247, 1274, 1277, 1279 (2019); see also Ilya Somin, Broader Implications of the Supreme Court’s Sports 
Gambling Decision, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 16, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/ 
2018/05/16/broader-implications-of-the-supreme-cour [http://perma.cc/SYX5-QTXZ] [hereinafter 
Somin, Broader Implications] (suggesting that Murphy is “good news for sanctuary cities”). 
 126 See Josh Blackman, Improper Commandeering, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 959, 982 (2019) 
(discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012), which proscribes any federal, state, or local governmental entity 
from prohibiting another government entity from exchanging information with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service regarding the immigration status of any individual). 
 127 Sam Kamin, Opinion, Murphy v. NCAA: It’s About Much More than Gambling on Sports, HILL 
(May 15, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/387653-murphy-v-ncaa-its-about-much-
more-than-gambling-on-sports [http://perma.cc/DFF2-H9K3]. 
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But the most straightforward reading of Murphy, as advocated by 
Professors Rick Hills and Ilya Somin,128 shows that the Court’s opinion does 
not threaten all preemptive federal laws under the banner of anti-
commandeering, at least as it pertains to environmental legislation. Long-
standing theory of preemption, pioneering cases on commandeering, and 
even the approach in Murphy itself all demonstrate that Congress’s broad 
preemption power remains untouched by Murphy’s reformulation of the 
anticommandeering rule, as long as Congress correctly preempts. 
Preemption has consistently been recognized as an alternative way for 
Congress to regulate intrastate activities while avoiding the 
anticommandeering problem.129 As Professor Andrew Ayers described, 
“Congress does not impermissibly commandeer the states when it uses its 
preemption power, even when it regulates individuals directly in an area 
where states have traditionally been the primary regulators.”130 The 
foundational anticommandeering cases explicitly stated that preemption was 
not limited by the Tenth Amendment,131 and offered preemption, conditional 
preemption, and conditional spending as alternatives to unconstitutional 
commandeering.132 Moreover, the analysis in Murphy is consistent with these 
earlier cases: the Court first asked whether PASPA’s anti-authorization 
provision violated the anticommandeering principle and then considered 
whether it could be saved from unconstitutionality as a valid preemption 
provision.133 Thus, as long as a law meets the requirements to constitute a 
 
 128 See Rick Hills, Murphy v. NCAA’s Escape from Baseline Hell, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 16, 2018, 
7:11 PM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/murphy-v-ncaas-escape-from-baseline-
hell.html [http://perma.cc/U9NN-JD32] (arguing that Murphy’s new framework for commandeering does 
not threaten traditional preemption); Somin, Broader Implications, supra note 125 (doubting that Murphy 
undermines federal preemption power). 
 129 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 25, at 1673 (“[T]he Rehnquist Court left preemption wide open as an 
alternative to commandeering.”). 
 130 Andrew B. Ayers, Federalism and the Right to Decide Who Decides, 63 VILL. L. REV. 567, 590 
(2018). 
 131 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 913 (1997) (stating that issues of commandeering are 
avoided if the Brady Act’s questionable provisions “are taken to refer to nothing more (or less) than the 
duty owed to the National Government, on the part of all state officials, to enact, enforce, and interpret 
state law in such fashion as not to obstruct the operation of federal law”); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require the 
States to regulate. The Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and 
to pre-empt contrary state regulation.”); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 
264, 290–91 (1981) (“A wealth of precedent attests to congressional authority to displace or pre-empt 
state laws regulating private activity affecting interstate commerce when these laws conflict with federal 
law[,]” and “nothing in National League of Cities suggests that the Tenth Amendment shields the States 
from pre-emptive federal regulation of private activities affecting interstate commerce.”). 
 132 See New York, 505 U.S. at 166–67. 
 133 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478–79 (2018). 
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valid exercise of preemption, as discussed below, anticommandeering 
concerns fall by the wayside. 
Murphy’s second doctrinal impact is its test for determining whether a 
regulatory scheme is a valid form of preemption altogether. According to 
Murphy, a valid preemption provision (a) “represent[s] the exercise of a 
power conferred on Congress by the Constitution,” and (b) is “best read as 
[a law] that regulates private actors.”134 More specifically, the Court 
instructed that all valid preemption schemes involve a federal law that 
“imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors” and a state law that 
“confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal law,” 
leading the federal law to take precedence and preempt the state law.135 In 
sum, under this refined test for preemption, federal laws that primarily direct 
regulation at states by prohibiting them from acting (such as PASPA) are no 
longer valid forms of preemption, and instead, constitute commandeering. 
While pivoting away from the action versus inaction division that 
previously distinguished commandeering from preemption,136 the Murphy 
Court supplanted that line with a reframed one that focuses on the identity of 
the regulated party: whether the law is best read to regulate private actors, or 
to act upon the state directly.137 Applying that test, the Court found that 
PASPA’s anti-authorization provision did not grant individuals a federal 
right to engage in sports gambling, nor did it prohibit private actors from 
doing so.138 Instead, PASPA issued a direct command prohibiting state 
authorization.139 Thus, the anti-authorization provision was not a valid form 
of preemption, and anticommandeering principles doomed the law.140 
In sum, the Court in Murphy may have expanded the 
anticommandeering doctrine and eliminated the easy test between 
commandeering and preemption that prohibited affirmative directives to 
states (as unlawful commandeering) but permitted mere instructions to 
forbear (as valid preemption). But in its place, Murphy substituted another 
formalist distinction that turns on the target of regulation—whether Congress 
is regulating the state directly or regulating private actors, and if the latter, 
 
 134 Id. at 1479. 
 135 Id. at 1480. 
 136 See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text; supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text. 
 137 Id. at 1479. 
 138 Id. at 1481. Strangely, the Court declined to consider the fact that PASPA’s second provision 
directly prohibited private actors from engaging in sports gambling. Melone, supra note 122, at 446 
(“Although the Court noted the existence of this provision, it did not discuss the provision in the context 
of preemption, but instead, it discussed this provision only in the context of its severability from the 
operative provision at issue.”); see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484. 
 139 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2000), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461. 
 140 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481. 
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whether Congress is only indirectly precluding the states from acting. 
Murphy also left preemption as a clear alternative means of achieving the 
same end as commandeering: eliminating state regulatory discretion.  
Using the Clean Air Act to test Murphy’s application, the remainder of 
this Note demonstrates that Murphy’s formalist approach is flawed in two 
respects: (a) it problematically fails to account for certain cooperative 
federalism schemes where Congress is in dialogue with state legislatures 
with the joint goal of regulating third parties, and (b) it fails to apply a 
consistent standard of protecting federalism values to preemption and 
commandeering. 
II. VEHICLE EMISSIONS REGULATION UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
Environmental regulation is fraught with tension between federal and 
state control, which is at an apex with the Clean Air Act.141 States have long 
played a critical role in environmental regulation, since responsibility for 
environmental protection originally fell exclusively to state governments.142 
California broke ground in 1960, enacting the first vehicle emissions control 
program in the nation to address serious smog problems in Los Angeles.143 
Five years later, Congress followed California’s lead by passing a precursor 
to the Clean Air Act that imposed federal automobile emissions standards 
which were then rolled into the Clean Air Act of 1970.144 
Noting that environmental policy efforts at the state level preceded 
federal programs in many respects, it is no surprise that drafters of the Clean 
Air Act envisioned a continued role for states like California in controlling 
air pollution, and the Act is now heralded as a model of cooperative 
federalism.145 This Part details the Act’s unique preemptive structure for 
vehicle emissions regulation, chronicles the leading role that states have 
played to spur greater pollution control, and describes the effects of the 
EPA’s SAFE Rule. 
 
 141 Adler, supra note 75, at 447 (“Among all federal environmental statutes, the Clean Air Act [] is 
the source of the greatest state-federal conflict.”). 
 142 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 
54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1147 (1995). 
 143 PERCIVAL, supra note 5, at 527; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: 
A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 585 (2001). California promulgated the first vehicle 
emissions standards in 1961. See Adelman, supra note 2, at 252–53. 
 144 Revesz, supra note 143, at 585–86. 
 145 See Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1550 n.7; Holly Doremus & W. Michael 
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is 
Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 800 (2008); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., 
Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in 
Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 
15, 16 (2004). 
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A. The Clean Air Act’s Preemptive Structure 
Most of the Clean Air Act imposes floor preemption, setting federal 
standards for air pollutants but permitting more stringent state regulations.146 
But in the case of air pollutants resulting from vehicles, the Act requires 
national uniformity, expressly stating that “[n]o state . . . shall adopt or 
attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new 
motor vehicles.”147 However, Congress qualified this preemption provision 
with a mechanism for California alone to seek a waiver of preemption.148 
Using this waiver provision, California successfully obtained more than fifty 
waivers since 1967.149 
Importantly, the Act does not grant the EPA, the agency tasked with 
carrying out the Clean Air Act, complete discretion in denying or granting 
California a waiver. Instead, the Act states that the EPA Administrator 
“shall” grant a waiver if California “determines that the State standards will 
be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as 
applicable Federal standards.”150 It also permits the Administrator to deny a 
waiver application if she finds the presence of one of three conditions: (a) 
California’s determination that its standards are at least as protective as the 
federal standards is arbitrary and capricious; (b) California’s standards are 
not needed to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions;151 or (c) the 
 
 146 See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012) (stating that, except in the case of vehicle emissions, nothing in the 
Clean Air Act precludes any state from adopting or enforcing emissions standards that are at least as 
stringent as the federal requirements); see also Revesz, supra note 143, at 586. 
 147 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). This particular provision was motivated by Congress’s fear that automobile 
manufacturers might face up to fifty different standards if states could independently regulate emissions. 
See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1195 
(1995). 
 148 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b); Carlson, supra note 4, at 292–93 (describing how California is the only state 
that is eligible to receive a waiver); see also supra note 4. 
 149 Memorandum from John B. Stephenson, Dir., Nat. Res. & Env’t, U.S. GAO, to Congressional 
Requesters (Jan. 16, 2009), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09249r.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM6H-
4TR4]. 
 150 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). 
 151 The EPA’s well-established practice is to review California’s vehicle emissions program 
holistically when analyzing whether it is needed to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions.” See 
CARLSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 14. The EPA has interpreted the query to refer to whether there are 
general circumstances unique to California that are primarily responsible for causing its air pollution 
problem. Id. at 15; see also Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver, 73 Fed. Reg. 12156, 12159–60 (Mar. 
6, 2008). Each time it has applied for a waiver, California has successfully demonstrated that its unique 
geography and weather pattern exacerbate the effects of climate change and that vehicle emissions limits 
are linked to a reduction in smog and the impacts of climate change, and these underlying circumstances 
remain the case today. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 15–16, n.77. 
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state standards are inconsistent with the requirements for federal emissions 
standards under the Clean Air Act.152 
The history of the Clean Air Act’s enactment also indicates that 
Congress intended the presumption that California is entitled to a waiver, 
with the goal of preserving California’s regulatory authority.153 As to the 
presumption, the House of Representatives considered an amendment to the 
Act in 1967 that would shift the burden to California to show that it required 
more stringent standards but rejected the change, leaving the presumption in 
place.154 Regarding the driving purpose behind the waiver, legislative history 
also provides evidence that Congress included the waiver provision not 
because California had a particularly bad smog problem, but to enable 
California’s continued experimentation in vehicle emissions regulation for 
the benefit of the nation.155 The D.C. Circuit has used this history to uphold 
the EPA Administrator’s grant of a waiver against challenges from the 
automobile industry, reasoning that  
The history of congressional consideration of the California waiver 
provision . . . indicates that Congress intended the State to continue and expand 
its pioneering efforts at adopting and enforcing motor vehicle emission 
standards different from and in large measure more advanced than the 
corresponding federal program; in short, to act as a kind of laboratory for 
innovation.156 
 
 152 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). The third condition, (c), requires that the rules governing the EPA’s 
determination of national standards also apply to California’s setting of standards. For example, both the 
national and California standards must provide four years of lead time before enforcing a revised standard 
for heavy-duty vehicles. See id. § 7521(a)(3)(C). 
 153 Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1110–11 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Rachel L. Chanin, 
Note, California’s Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 699, 716–19 (2003). For deeper background on the rich history of the Clean Air Act and 
California’s pioneering role in the area of vehicle emissions regulation, see, for example, JAMES E. KRIER 
& EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 
WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 1940–1975, at 177–95 (1977); Chanin, supra, at 713–21. 
 154 Chanin, supra note 153, at 714–16; see H.R. REP. NO. 90-728, at 22 (1967), as reprinted in 
1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1938, 1958. 
 155 See Waiver of Federal Preemption Notice of Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 18887, 18890 (May 3, 1984) 
(granting California a preemption waiver and stating that “[i]f Congress had been concerned only with 
California’s smog problem, however, it easily could have limited the ability of California to set more 
stringent standards . . . . Instead, Congress took a broader approach consistent with its goal of allowing 
California to operate its own comprehensive program.”); Chanin, supra note 153, at 717–19 (quoting 
several legislators’ statements on the rationale for Congress’s inclusion of the California waiver). 
 156 Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 1110–11. The court quoted the House Committee Report 
for the 1977 Amendment to the Act, which permitted other states to adopt California’s standards, as 
stating that “[t]he Committee amendment is intended to ratify and strengthen the California waiver 
provision and to affirm the underlying intent of that provision, i.e., to afford California the broadest 
possible discretion in selecting the best means to protect the health of its citizens and the public welfare.” 
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Further solidifying California’s position as a leader in environmental 
regulation, Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1977 to permit any other 
state to adopt California’s emissions standards in lieu of the federal 
standards.157 Other states were still preempted from establishing independent 
regulatory systems but could enforce standards that were “identical” to 
California’s preemption-waived standards.158 As Professor Jody Freeman 
remarked, the Act “thus essentially authorize[d] a ‘two-car’ country [in 
which] the auto industry must meet EPA emissions standards nationally, and 
may also need to meet even more stringent standards in California (and the 
so-called ‘section 177 states’ that adopt California’s standards).”159 Thirteen 
states and the District of Columbia currently follow California’s standards, 
in total representing over 35% of new vehicles sold in the United States.160 
B. The Role of States in Greenhouse Gas Regulation 
As bureaucracy and partisanship stymie federal lawmaking and as 
Presidential administration turnovers make agency rules impermanent,161 
states can be a source of administrative regularity and adapt policies more 
 
Id. at 1110 (quoting H. R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 301–02 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 
1380–81). 
 157 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2012); see also May, supra note 22, at 474. 
 158 42 U.S.C. § 7507. 
 159 Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the “Car Deal,” 
35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 350 n.42 (2011). “Section 177 states” refers to the states that choose, 
under Section 177 of the Clean Air Act, to adopt California’s standards in lieu of the federal standards. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 7507. 
 160 A Brief History of US Fuel Efficiency Standards, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-vehicles/fuel-efficiency/fuel-economy-basics.html 
[https://perma.cc/HT2T-52UY]. These states are Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of 
Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Washington. States that Have Adopted California’s Vehicle Standards Under 
Section 177 of the Federal Clean Air Act, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (Sept. 27, 2019), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/ 
resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal 
[https://perma.cc/R7SQ-W3AY]; U.S.: Section 177 States, TRANSPORTPOLICY.NET, https://www. 
transportpolicy.net/standard/us-section-177-states/ [https://perma.cc/8GCH-2YCZ]. Additionally, in 
September 2019, the governors of Minnesota and New Mexico both announced plans to adopt the 
California standards under Section 177. David Shepardson, Minnesota, New Mexico to Adopt California 
Vehicle Emissions Rules, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-
emissions-california-minnesota/minnesota-new-mexico-to-adopt-california-vehicle-emissions-rules-
idUSKBN1WA2SJ [https://perma.cc/WTU8-TLLQ]. 
 161 See, e.g., Nadja Popovich et al., 85 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back Under Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environment-
rollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/8LFL-Q3VF]; Connor Raso, Where and Why Has Agency Rulemaking 
Declined Under Trump?, BROOKINGS (June 29, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/where-and-
why-has-agency-rulemaking-declined-under-trump/ [https://perma.cc/5M4J-SDHP]. 
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quickly, driving innovation.162 Policies addressing climate change are a 
prime example, as states have played a leading role in securing federal 
regulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) under the Clean Air Act.163 The Act 
delegates authority to the EPA to identify which air pollutants are anticipated 
to “endanger public health or welfare” and thus must be subject to emissions 
standards.164 For decades, the EPA passed regulations setting standards for 
hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, and other hazardous air 
pollutants, achieving more than 90% reductions in those tailpipe 
emissions.165 Notably, GHGs were not deemed to have an adverse impact on 
public health or welfare and, thus, were not subject to the Clean Air Act until 
significant efforts by states along two fronts. 
First, several states petitioned the EPA in the 1990s to regulate GHGs 
on the grounds that GHG emissions “endanger public health or welfare.”166 
The EPA rejected the suggestion, but Massachusetts challenged this denial 
in court in 2005.167 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that 
GHGs do constitute “air pollutants” and must be regulated under the Clean 
Air Act if they endanger public health or welfare.168 In December 2009, the 
EPA complied with the Court’s instruction and found that GHG emissions 
pollute the air and “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health 
or welfare,” thus requiring the EPA to set GHG emissions standards.169 
Second, states took it upon themselves to regulate GHG emissions. In 
2002, California passed the first legislation requiring automobile 
manufacturers to reduce GHG emissions, which would apply to model year 
2009 vehicles.170 Other states followed suit, adopting California’s GHG 
 
 162 See David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories of 
Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 
355–57 (1994); Revesz, supra note 143, at 631. 
 163 May, supra note 22, at 470–72. For background on greenhouse gases, see supra note 30. 
 164 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012). 
 165 History of Reducing Air Pollution from Transportation in the United States, U.S. EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/accomplishments-and-success-
air-pollution-transportation [https://perma.cc/MFV7-ZHYU]. 
 166 See May, supra note 22, at 472. 
 167 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922–23 (Sept. 
8, 2003); Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 168 549 U.S. 497, 528, 532 (2007). 
 169 Freeman, supra note 159, at 351; see also Endangerment Findings, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66496 
(Dec. 15, 2009) (“[G]reenhouse gases taken in combination endanger both the public health and the public 
welfare of current and future generations.”). 
 170 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2002); see also Keeth, supra note 22, at 719 
(explaining that the California law is “the first law of its kind in the nation requiring automakers to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases”). 
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emissions limits pending the EPA’s approval of California’s waiver.171 
California petitioned the EPA in 2005 for a preemption waiver to implement 
its new GHG emissions standards, but despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the agency denied California’s waiver request in 
December 2007—the first denial in thirty-seven years.172 EPA Administrator 
Stephen Johnson explained that “greenhouse gases are fundamentally global 
in nature,” and therefore, California failed to show a “need to meet 
compelling and extraordinary conditions” as required by the Clean Air 
Act.173 But soon thereafter in 2008, after political pressure and a change in 
executive administration, the EPA reconsidered the denial and granted the 
waiver for California’s GHG standards,174 determining that “it makes no 
difference whether California seeks a waiver to implement separate 
standards in response to its own specific, local air pollution problems, or 
whether California seeks a waiver to implement separate standards designed 
to address a global air pollution problem.”175 
C. The SAFE Rule: Withdrawing California’s  
Preemption Waiver 
In 2009, the Obama Administration proposed a bold increase in federal 
standards for vehicle emissions and fuel economy, and secured agreement 
from American automakers on the condition that the national standards were 
harmonized with California’s regulations to avoid the two-car country.176 
California agreed to revise its emissions requirements for vehicles sold in the 
state such that cars that met the new federal standards would be deemed to 
 
 171 May, supra note 22, at 475; see also PEW CTR. ON GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, LEARNING FROM 
STATE ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2005), https://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/ 
reports/2006report/2005-12-08_PEW_CENTER_REPORT.PDF [https://perma.cc/J37H-SZT7] (listing 
ten states that planned to follow California’s vehicle standards for GHG emissions). 
 172 See JAMES E. MCCARTHY & ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RES. SERV., CALIFORNIA’S WAIVER 
REQUEST UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES FROM MOTOR  
VEHICLES 5, 10–11 (2009), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc87329/m1/1/high_res_d/ 
RL34099_2009Feb10.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPX4-YG22]; May, supra note 22, at 475–76; Stephenson, 
supra note 149, at 2. 
 173 Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Adm’r, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal.  
(Dec. 19, 2007), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-10/documents/20071219-slj.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H46D-4Y48]. 
 174 Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver, 74 Fed. Reg. 32744 (July 8, 2009); Freeman, supra note 
159, at 352; Laura Hall, Note, The Evolution of CAFE Standards: Fuel Economy Regulation Enters Its 
Second Act, 39 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 19–20 (2011). 
 175 SAFE Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 42986, 43241 (Aug. 24, 2018). 
 176 Hall, supra note 174, at 20–23. The “two-car country” describes how manufacturers may need to 
develop two separate vehicle fleets, one to meet the national standard and another to meet the higher 
California standard. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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be in compliance with California’s standards177—but maintained its more 
stringent standards on the books.178 Thus, if the federal standards became 
more lenient, California could revoke the reciprocity with federal standards 
and once again require manufacturers to meet the state standards.179 
The EPA granted California’s latest request for a waiver of preemption 
for its Advanced Clean Cars program, Zero Emissions Vehicle mandate, and 
more stringent GHG standards in January 2013, a waiver that extended 
through model year 2025 vehicles.180 Meanwhile, the EPA continued to 
increase the standards annually, and in the waning days of President 
Obama’s tenure, the EPA published a Final Determination in January 2017 
that locked emissions standards through 2025.181 
However, just two months later and after a change in administration, 
new EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt announced an intention to reconsider 
the 2017 Final Determination and assess whether the standards through 2025 
were appropriate.182 Then, in April 2018, the EPA formally withdrew the 
2017 Final Determination and reopened the rulemaking process to set new 
standards for 2022 to 2025 in light of “recent data” that the Obama 
Administration purportedly failed to consider.183 
On August 24, 2018, the EPA proposed a new plan, the Safer 
Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Rule, which would freeze standards at 
2020 levels through 2026.184 The SAFE Rule also proposed to withdraw the 
preemption waivers previously granted to California through 2025, 
eliminating California’s ability to set emissions standards that deviate 
whatsoever from the now-frozen federal standards.185 The EPA cited two 
primary justifications under the Clean Air Act’s waiver denial provisions for 
 
 177 2010 Final Rule: Light-Duty Vehicle Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 25328 (May 7, 2010). 
 178 See Letter from Mary D. Nichols, Chairman, CARB, to Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, EPA, & Ray 
LaHood, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (May 18, 2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
10/documents/air-resources-board.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJK5-WTEN]. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver, 78 Fed. Reg. 2112 (Jan. 9, 2013). 
 181 See U.S. EPA, FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE MODEL YEAR  
2022–2025 LIGHT-DUTY VEHICLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS STANDARDS UNDER THE  
MIDTERM EVALUATION (2017), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100QQ91.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/59SV-B2UU]. 
 182 Notice of Intention to Reconsider Midterm Determination, 82 Fed. Reg. 14671 (Mar. 22, 2017). 
 183 Press Release, U.S. EPA, GHG Emissions Standards for Cars and Light Trucks Should Be 
Revised (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-administrator-pruitt-ghg-emissions-
standards-cars-and-light-trucks-should-be [https://perma.cc/2PHU-8DQ6]. 
 184 SAFE Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 42986, 42988 (Aug. 24, 2018). 
 185 Id. at 43232; see also U.S. EPA, PROPOSED CALIFORNIA WAIVER WITHDRAWAL (2018), 
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100V26M.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X4H-2QH6]. 
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withdrawing California’s waiver.186 First, the EPA asserted that California 
does not need its more stringent standards to meet “compelling and 
extraordinary conditions” because the standards (a) address environmental 
problems not unique to California, (b) are not necessitated by emissions 
unique to California, and (c) will not provide a remedy unique to 
California.187 Second, the EPA claimed that California’s emissions standards 
are technologically infeasible for car manufacturers to meet without 
additional time to develop new technology and, therefore, are inconsistent 
with the Clean Air Act’s national emissions requirements.188 Additionally, 
the EPA claimed that California’s entire ability to set these vehicle emissions 
standards is preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 
which grants the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration the power 
to set fuel economy guidelines.189 Therefore, the EPA concluded, any 
waivers granted to California are moot. 
In September 2019, the EPA published the first part of the final SAFE 
Rule, the One National Program, which finalizes the revocation of 
California’s waiver and makes clear that the state is preempted from setting 
vehicle GHG emissions limits or mandating zero-emissions vehicles.190 This 
is the first instance in history where the EPA has attempted to revoke a 
preemption waiver; the proper procedure for doing so, and indeed the very 
 
 186 Whether or not the statutory justifications for denying a waiver apply to a revocation of an 
already-granted waiver is a central issue in the current legal arguments against the SAFE Rule. See, e.g., 
DENISE A. GRAB ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, NO TURNING BACK 1–16 (2018). 
 187 U.S. EPA, supra note 185. Under President Bush, the EPA used similar reasoning to initially deny 
a preemption waiver that would allow California to regulate vehicle GHG emissions, which the EPA later 
granted under President Obama. See supra notes 176–181 and accompanying text. 
 188 Id. Recall that the Clean Air Act’s waiver provision states that no waiver shall be issued if 
California’s standards are “not consistent” with the Act’s requirements for the national standard. See 
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(C) (2012). Here, the EPA invoked Section 202(a)(2), which provides that any 
emissions regulation “shall take effect after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit 
the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost 
of compliance within such period.” Id. § 7521(a)(2). Accordingly, the EPA argued that California’s 
standards take effect too early. For a helpful economic argument about why this lead time concern is 
unfounded, see generally NOLL ET AL., supra note 11. 
 189 Keith Goldberg, Auto Emissions Plan Hearing Sparks Regulator War of Words, LAW360 (June 
20, 2019, 7:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1171231/auto-emissions-plan-hearing-sparks-
regulator-war-of-words [https://perma.cc/YE4R-VEE9]. For further information on this argument, see 
CAFE Standards and the California Preemption Plan, HARV. L. SCH. ENVTL. & ENERGY L. PROGRAM 
(Aug. 24, 2018), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/cafe-standards-and-the-california-preemption-
plan/ [https://perma.cc/P3ZY-NA8R]. For responses to this specific argument, see CARLSON ET AL., 
supra note 18, at 17–19, and GRAB ET AL., supra note 186, at 17–18. 
 190 SAFE Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310, 51310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533). The Administration anticipates issuing the complementary final rule 
rolling back national emissions standards in the near future. Id. 
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legality of a revocation, is currently the topic of debate.191 No matter the 
result of that procedural dispute, the revocation has reinvigorated discussion 
about the role of states in environmental protection. 
III. FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY OVER VEHICLE EMISSIONS 
REGULATION AFTER MURPHY 
Murphy fractured the preexisting line separating impermissible 
commandeering from permissible preemption, which caused concern over 
what impact the broadened commandeering prohibition has on the 
availability of preemption as an alternative.192 In fact, this issue arose in oral 
arguments in Murphy itself.193 But as legal precedent, Murphy has little 
impact on Congress’s broad power over state regulation. Rather than 
providing clarity or guiding principles for the bounds of federal control of 
state policy, the Court swapped one formalist distinction in favor of another: 
from an action versus inaction division to a test hinging on whether the party 
most directly regulated is the state or private actors.194 
The result of this formalism is a nod toward tightening commandeering 
restrictions, but the unbounded availability of preemption as an alternative 
approach to the same ends means that the anticommandeering doctrine is 
mostly toothless to protect the states’ abilities to control private activities. 
Congress can merely replace a commandeering scheme with a preemptive 
one, and the impact is the same: in both cases, it disarms the states from 
acting, yet one method is constitutional while the other is not. With PASPA 
deemed unconstitutional commandeering, for example, states may now 
legalize sports gambling,195 but Congress could enact federal legislation 
prohibiting individuals from engaging in sports gambling and preempt all 
related state regulation, achieving the same outcome as PASPA sought. 
California is in the midst of a battle with the EPA to retain its fifty-year-
long ability to set more stringent vehicle emissions standards than the 
 
 191 See, e.g., GRAB ET AL., supra note 186, at i. 
 192 See supra Section I.D; see, e.g., Melone, supra note 122, at 442 (“The Court’s clarification that 
the federal government can no more order a state to do nothing than it can order a state to do something 
begs the question of how the anticommandeering principle coexists with preemption.”). 
 193 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1461 (2018) (Nos. 16-476, 16-477) (where Justice Kagan asked Paul Clement, representing the NCAA, 
“what’s the line you would draw as between preemption and commandeering?”); id. at 9 (where Justice 
Kagan asked Ted Olson, representing the state of New Jersey, “[w]hen do we know that [the federal 
government has] enacted a sufficiently comprehensive regulatory scheme in order to allow preemption 
of state rules?”). 
 194 See supra Section I.D. 
 195 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85 (2018). 
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national requirement.196 While the Court’s decision in Murphy reinvigorated 
the conversation about the mechanics of federalism and expanded the 
anticommandeering doctrine, it does little to protect California against the 
revocation of its preemption waiver. The revocation would translate to a 
federal command that California forbear from regulating—ostensibly an 
action now subject to a commandeering analysis according to Murphy. Yet 
even with Murphy’s stricter commandeering prohibition, the broad 
preemption power allows the Act to escape all Tenth Amendment concerns. 
This Part begins by applying Murphy to the Clean Air Act and 
determining that while the EPA’s revocation of California’s waiver may 
raise federalism concerns, Murphy is of no help to California’s case because 
preemption remains available as a trump card to any commandeering 
challenge. Using the revocation of California’s waiver as an illustration, this 
Part then argues that Murphy’s clarified distinction between preemption and 
commandeering is too imprecise and formalist to account for modern 
cooperative federalism programs. Finally, it concludes by counseling 
hesitation before Congress or the courts throw out the delicate balance of the 
existing system. 
A. Applying Murphy to the California Waiver Revocation 
As noted above, a majority of the Clean Air Act only conditionally 
preempts state air pollution regulation.197 For example, the EPA sets national 
standards for stationary sources of pollution such as factories, power plants, 
and oil refineries, but invites states to prepare individual state 
implementation plans that meet the federal criteria.198 States are free to 
impose more stringent pollution limitations on certain polluters, and only if 
a state fails to submit a sufficient plan of its own may the EPA require the 
state to adopt the federal implementation plan.199 This conditional 
preemption scheme avoids a commandeering problem by giving states a 
choice between enacting state plans that conform to the federal program or 
having state air pollution regulation preempted by federal law.200 
 
 196 See Complaint, California v. Chao, supra note 14 (challenging the Trump Administration’s 
rescission of California’s waiver as unlawful); see also Press Release, Attorney General Becerra Files 
Lawsuit Challenging Trump Administration’s Attempt to Trample California’s Authority to Maintain 
Longstanding Clean Car Standards (Sept. 20, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-
general-becerra-files-lawsuit-challenging-trump-administration%E2%80%99s [https://perma.cc/N3EV-
ESYK]. 
 197 See supra note 146. 
 198 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2012). 
 199 See id. §§ 7410(c)(1), 7416. 
 200 Siegel, supra note 25, at 1676. 
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Vehicle emissions are treated differently, however, with the Act 
imposing unitary federal choice ceiling preemption on all states and 
providing a presumed waiver for California. This particular provision 
explicitly prohibits any state from adopting “any standard relating to the 
control of emissions from new motor vehicles.”201 Under Murphy’s refined 
definition of commandeering—violation of the principle that Congress 
cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—the Clean Air Act’s 
proscription of any state regulation is an express federal prohibition of state 
action that, under Murphy, is now subject to the anticommandeering 
doctrine.202 
The analysis in Murphy did not stop at this first step, however. The 
Court progressed to consider whether PASPA could be saved as a valid form 
of preemption.203 Under the Court’s preemption test, judges must consider 
whether a law is “best read” to primarily regulate states or private parties.204 
In Murphy, the Court concluded that PASPA’s anti-authorization 
provision205 primarily regulated states by prohibiting the legalization of 
sports gambling206—notwithstanding that PASPA ultimately regulated 
individuals by prohibiting the act of sports wagering, albeit indirectly. In 
asking whether PASPA primarily regulated states or private parties, the 
Court only looked at PASPA’s anti-authorization provision but did not 
discuss how PASPA’s second, parallel provision207 directly prohibited 
private actors from operating or promoting sports gambling schemes.208 
Therefore, one could take Murphy’s application of the preemption test to 
instruct courts to evaluate provisions independently and not within the 
broader context of the statute. 
Under that approach, courts could review the Clean Air Act’s 
preemption provision—which directs that “[n]o State . . . shall adopt or 
attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new 
motor vehicles” and “[n]o State shall require certification, inspection, or any 
other approval relating to the control of emissions from any new motor 
vehicle”—and conclude that it is best read to regulate states, not private 
 
 201 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 
 202 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1467 (2018). 
 203 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 204 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479; see supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text. 
 205 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2000), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461; see also supra notes 86–87 
and accompanying text. 
 206 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481. 
 207 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (2000), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461; see also supra note 87 and 
accompanying text. 
 208 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484; see also Melone, supra note 122, at 446. 
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actors.209 This result would compel a court to strike down the Clean Air Act’s 
prohibition of state regulation altogether as a form of commandeering and 
not a valid form of preemption, making it unconstitutional for Congress to 
prevent fifty different standards for vehicle emissions. But it is inconceivable 
that Congress could lack the ability to prohibit states from contradicting a 
federal law regulating national commerce, a power vested in the 
Constitution, critical to the federal system, and which the Supreme Court has 
recognized since the early days of the nation.210 
Looking instead at the Clean Air Act’s vehicle emissions regulation 
comprehensively, courts would likely view the regulatory scheme as crafted 
to primarily impose requirements on vehicle manufacturers (private 
actors),211 and only secondarily crafted to prohibit states from imposing an 
entirely different set of requirements.212 Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, 
which directs the EPA to set emissions standards for new motor vehicles, 
represents a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce power,213 and directly 
regulates manufacturers as private actors.214 It both imposes a restriction on 
private actors and also confers the right to be free of state regulation in excess 
of the federal requirements.215 Thus, even if the Act does commandeer state 
legislatures by instructing that they forbear from any vehicle emissions 
regulation, that its focus is regulating private actors renders it a valid exercise 
of Congress’s preemption power and therefore exempt from the 
commandeering prohibition. 
Under this formalist approach to the Tenth Amendment set out in 
Murphy, the fact that environmental protection originally fell within state 
 
 209 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012). 
 210 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have [p]ower . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210–11 
(1824) (“[T]he framers of our constitution . . . declar[ed] the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws 
made in pursuance of it. . . . In every such case [where laws enacted by states interfere with laws of 
Congress], the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the 
exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.”). The Commerce Clause provides the constitutional 
basis for a wide range of Congressional acts. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 247.  
 211 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a). 
 212 Id. § 7543. 
 213 See Sidney Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the Commerce Power 
to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1067–78 (1965).  
 214 See 42 U.S.C. § 7522 (enumerating the prohibitions under the Act, which fall on manufacturers 
or individual persons); see also id. § 7524 (imposing civil penalties on persons that violate these 
standards). 
 215 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018) (contrasting PASPA 
from the federal alien registration standards at issue in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), 
which “not only impose[d] federal registration obligations on aliens but also confer[red] a federal right 
to be free from any other registration requirements”). 
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police power216 and that states have long taken the lead in air pollution 
regulation217 is irrelevant. The procedure involved in the revocation is 
similarly irrelevant—the fact that California has set independent standards 
for the past fifty years, and was granted a waiver of preemption which is now 
being revoked, does not make it any more of a case of commandeering. 
B. Critiquing the Revised Distinction 
The foregoing application demonstrates that Murphy does nothing to 
disarm the EPA from revoking California’s waiver. While there may be 
procedural issues with the revocation process itself,218 Congress has the 
authority to fully preempt California’s vehicle standards and can therefore 
delegate to the EPA an ability to withhold a preemption waiver, subjecting 
California to the same preemption rule that applies to other states. This 
withdrawal of California’s authority to set emissions standards and a zero-
emissions vehicle mandate, while perhaps uncomfortable from a states-rights 
perspective, creates no legal Tenth Amendment issue under the Court’s 
current precedent. 
However, applying Murphy’s distinction between preemption and 
commandeering to the vehicle emissions regulatory regime highlights two 
reasons to critique Murphy’s formalism: first, it poorly accounts for certain 
cooperative federalism schemes, and second, leaving preemption unbounded 
as a legal alternative to commandeering renders these federalism protections 
a matter of form, not substance. 
1. Complex Cooperative Federalism Programs 
Murphy’s formalist distinction between preemption and 
commandeering fails to address a matter at the core of the Tenth 
Amendment: how to effectively manage complex cooperative federalism 
regimes that bring the federal and state governments together to control 
private conduct. The sections of the Clean Air Act with which this Note is 
concerned primarily direct regulation at vehicle manufacturers, permissibly 
preempting contrary state regulations.219 But these provisions also command 
the EPA to grant California a waiver of preemption if California meets 
certain requirements.220 In this sense, Congress is speaking directly to 
California, inviting the state to participate in the regulatory process. 
 
 216 See Percival, supra note 142, at 1147. 
 217 See Revesz, supra note 143, at 592–93. 
 218 See GRAB ET AL., supra note 186, at i. 
 219 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012). 
 220 Id. § 7543(b). 
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The structure of the Clean Air Act’s waiver provision assumes that 
California is entitled to a waiver unless proven otherwise.221 It explicitly 
instructs that the EPA “shall . . . waive application” of the preemption 
provision if California determines that its standards are, in the aggregate, at 
least as stringent as the federal standards.222 In order to deny the waiver on 
these grounds, the EPA cannot merely disagree with California’s 
assessment; it must show that California’s determination is arbitrary and 
capricious.223 The Act identifies two other grounds on which the EPA can 
withhold a waiver: if California does not need the standards to meet 
compelling conditions,224 or if California’s standards are inconsistent with 
the Act’s procedural and substantive requirements for federal standard-
setting.225 Legislative history also shows that Congress intended California 
to enjoy the presumption of entitlement to a waiver of preemption.226 Thus, 
the Clean Air Act invites California to act as a second, technology-forcing 
regulator as long as the state meets the above-listed requirements to avoid 
the three possible grounds for denial of a waiver. 
In this type of system, where Congress engages in a dialogue with state 
legislatures and explicitly envisions a cooperative program to regulate third 
parties, Murphy’s preemption test of whether a law is “best read” to apply to 
states or private actors may return a fuzzy result, since these regulatory laws 
are directed at both. For example, both PASPA and the Clean Air Act 
constrain both private actors (by proscribing private operation of sports 
betting and by imposing emissions limits on manufacturers, respectively) 
and states (by prohibiting legalization of sports gambling and prohibiting 
independent state emissions standards).227 The nuance lies in whether a law 
more directly regulates states or private actors.228 
The Court in Murphy concluded that PASPA was more accurately 
described as a law restraining states from allowing private activity that 
Congress found censurable.229 But at its core, Congress’s aim was not to 
 
 221 See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text. 
 222 Id. §§ 7543(b)(1)–(2). 
 223 Id. § 7543(b)(1)(A). 
 224 Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B). 
 225 Id. §§ 7543(b)(1)(C), 7521(a). For further detail on the grounds for withholding a waiver, see 
supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 226 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 227 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2000) (PASPA), invalidated by Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521(a)(1), 7543(a) (2012) (Clean Air Act). 
 228 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479–80. 
 229 Id. at 1481. 
114:1015 (2020) Commandeering, Preemption, and Vehicle Emissions Regulation 
1051 
control states per se—it was to prohibit individuals from betting on sports.230 
If Murphy’s preemption rule considered the ultimate goal of the federal 
regulation, the Court may have found PASPA to primarily regulate private 
behavior (sports gambling), and thus be an appropriate form of preemption. 
Instead, the Court found the opposite, focusing on the form of the regulation 
(directed at state legislatures) rather than the purpose. 
Turning to the Clean Air Act, the analysis is murkier. The Act regulates 
vehicle manufacturers with the goal of addressing air pollution.231 But it also 
regulates state legislatures with the goal of avoiding a fifty-state approach to 
vehicle emissions regulation.232 In both form and purpose, therefore, the Act 
directs regulation at both states and private parties—and applying Murphy’s 
preemption test provides little insight on whether the law is an appropriate 
form of preemption or not. As this example shows, complex regulatory 
programs that involve both the federal government and states regulating third 
parties will prove difficult to analyze under the Court’s “best read” 
preemption analysis. 
2. Misaligned Federalism Concerns 
In the case of federal instructions for states to forbear from legislating, 
permitting unbounded preemption while strengthening the 
anticommandeering doctrine is questionable: preemption has the same 
impact and similar concerns as commandeering, and the unbounded 
availability of preemption as an alternative neutralizes the commandeering 
limit. 
First, even though Murphy’s clarified preemption test turns on the 
identity of the primarily regulated party, the impacts of preemptive and 
commandeering laws are the same: in both cases, the federal government 
forbids states from independently acting on private parties. In Printz, the 
Court recognized that laws directing state executive officials’ actions 
infringe upon a state legislature’s ability to manage state policy in the same 
way that federal commands directly to state legislatures did in New York.233 
Likewise, the Clean Air Act’s ceiling preemption infringes on the California 
legislature’s ability to control state environmental policy in much the same 
way. Despite Murphy’s attempts to clarify the line between preemption and 
commandeering, the results of both appear the same from the ground-level. 
 
 230 Id. at 1468–70 (chronicling the history of sports gambling prohibitions and the enactment of 
PASPA). 
 231 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). 
 232 Id. § 7543(a). 
 233 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
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N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1052 
Second, preemption may actually be more harmful to federalism 
principles than commandeering.234 Revoking California’s preemption waiver 
completely eliminates California’s ability to participate in any kind of 
cooperative scheme with Congress or federal regulators—it removes 
California’s seat at the table. Commandeering, at the very least, requires state 
involvement and some discretion in implementation of federal programs.235 
In that vein, Professor Neil Siegel cautions that the anticommandeering 
prohibition may actually harm state autonomy because when courts strike 
down commandeering laws, the federal government often responds with 
even broader preemption, shrinking state regulatory power even further.236 
More broadly, preemption leaves a state with no meaningful way to “prevent 
federal tyranny, advance political participation, encourage political 
responsiveness and accountability through interjurisdictional and 
intrajurisdictional competition, express the distinctive value commitments of 
the majority of their populations” or “serve as laboratories of 
experimentation”—all values at the core of the Tenth Amendment.237 
In sum, Murphy’s modified line between preemption and 
commandeering, which turns on the identity of the party primarily being 
regulated, is too rigid to account for certain cooperative federalism regimes 
that, as the next Section argues, may be normatively preferable to absolute 
preemption. Moreover, many scholars have urged that the commandeering 
doctrine must be strengthened against preemption if it is to mean anything at 
all.238 Instead, while expanding the anticommandeering doctrine in name, 
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But if the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering principle does not actually protect states’ rights to set and 
execute their own agendas, what is it designed to do?”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of 
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 813, 921 (1998) (“If there are no limits on Congress’s power to use conditional preemption, then 
New York is a meaningless formality, because the national government could always require that state 
and local governments either make policy according to federal standards or disband themselves.”); Siegel, 
supra note 25, at 1673 (“The Rehnquist Court’s apparent lack of concern for the impact of broad federal 
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Murphy leaves preemption untouched and therefore should not be read to 
herald protection of state sovereignty. 
C. Cautioning Against Broad Preemption in Vehicle Emissions Regulation 
This Note does not purport to advocate for a watershed reading of the 
Tenth Amendment that removes preemption as an alternative and returns to 
protect some core area of traditional state activities (a concept rejected in 
Garcia).239 That debate is a much larger topic involving serious 
consequences beyond the scope of this discussion.240 It suffices to 
acknowledge that California should take no comfort from the idea that 
Murphy signals that the Court is more sensitive to protecting a state’s ability 
to control state policy. As long as the validity of a preemptive law turns 
solely on whether the broader scheme is best read to primarily regulate 
private conduct, the Tenth Amendment is inapplicable to protect California 
against the waiver revocation. 
But even if federalism arguments about the EPA’s revocation of 
California’s waiver are unlikely to persuade a court under current precedent, 
there are strong normative reasons to counsel against broad ceiling 
preemption in environmental regulation. The Clean Air Act’s ceiling 
preemption strips states of the ability to drive innovation and respond to local 
needs, and it eliminates the national benefits that come from decentralized 
policy experimentation. Moreover, the traditional justifications for ceiling 
preemption are weaker in the context of vehicle emissions regulation. 
1. Benefits of Joint Federal–State Approaches to  
Environmental Policy 
There are compelling reasons to allow state participation in 
environmental regulation. As discussed earlier, states took the lead in air 
pollution regulation decades before the federal government stepped in, and 
even after implementation of the Clean Air Act, states continued to drive 
technological innovation ahead of the federal government.241 Studies have 
 
preemption on state regulatory control in the commandeering context is hardly sui generis. It is one of 
the puzzles of that Court’s legacy that the same Justices who wrote passionately about the virtues of 
federalism seemed somewhat tone deaf to the implications of broad federal preemption for the vindication 
of a substantive vision of state autonomy.”). 
 239 See supra note 45. 
 240 As Professor Siegel notes, if the Court were to “remove preemption as a constitutional 
alternative,” it would “radically transform[] the constitutional regime in which we live.” Siegel, supra 
note 25, at 1673, 1675. 
 241 See supra Section II.B; see also Revesz, supra note 143, at 579, 592 (discussing the early history 
of municipality regulation of air pollution in the 1880s and pioneering state initiatives to increase 
stringency that far outpaced federal efforts). As Professor Revesz notes, “the states, not the federal 
government, produced the most innovation in pollution control legislation in the 1990s.” Id. at 636. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1054 
also shown that state regulations were more effective than their federal 
counterparts,242 perhaps because states may be less susceptible to industry 
pressure.243 Aside from this historic role, state-driven policy change is more 
responsive to citizens.244 The leading role of federal agencies like the EPA in 
managing environmental policy means that it is all the more difficult for 
individuals to petition for policy changes through traditional political 
channels of elected officials. Professor Bulman-Pozen has commended how 
states can productively intervene in national policymaking by setting 
domestic state policy to challenge federal agency decisions.245 In that vein, 
California can productively intervene in national environmental regulation 
by serving as a check on the federal agencies, drawing a productive contrast 
in approaches and encouraging those agencies to either adopt a similar 
position or explain to the public why they have not done so. 
The unique structure of the Clean Air Act’s waiver provision, which 
allows at most one additional standard (set by California) beyond the federal 
minimum,246 provides the preceding benefits without imposing the unwieldy 
problem of permitting each state to set its own standard.247 Professor Ann 
Carlson describes such a system as a form of “modified federalism,” where 
“the federal government establishes innovative relationships with one or 
several states, rather than relying on the standard cooperative federalism 
arrangement” with all states.248 As argued below, ceiling preemption is often 
not appropriate or necessary in environmental regulation, which might lead 
to a conclusion that all states should have the authority to establish emissions 
requirements that comply with a federal minimum but better meet the 
economic and environmental needs of the state.249 The practical realities, 
however, make this politically and economically infeasible—to require 
 
 242 See id. at 580–81. Specifically, three studies found that pollution levels dropped significantly 
more under state regulations in the 1960s than under the subsequent federal Clean Air Act. Id. Professor 
Revesz notes that this outcome may be misleading because “the first reduction in pollutant levels may 
have been easier to achieve than subsequent reductions,” but remarks that at the very least, these studies 
show that state regulations were highly effective at reducing pollution levels even in the absence of federal 
regulation. Id. at 581.  
 243 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 310 (“[S]everal scholars have noted that environmental issues often 
become ‘federalized’ in part at the behest of industry. Industry representatives want national standards 
not only when they fear they will face multiple standards from the fifty states, but also, scholars contend, 
when they fear more progressive state legislation.”). 
 244 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 109, at 2051. 
 245 Id. 
 246 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012); supra notes 21, 159 and accompanying text. 
 247 Dwyer, supra note 147, at 1195 (describing Congress’s fears that automobile manufacturers 
might face up to fifty different standards). 
 248 Carlson, supra note 4, at 285, 313. 
 249 See infra Section III.C.2. 
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national manufacturers to meet up to fifty separate standards would 
significantly increase the cost of production and likely result in 
manufacturers building cars to meet the most stringent of state 
requirements.250 Balancing benefits against costs, the current system with 
two regulators, rather than fifty or the singular federal government, might be 
the best structure for the time being.251 Compared to a “scattershot approach” 
where all states could impose more stringent regulations, the two-regulator 
system concentrates research efforts, centralizes technological innovation, 
spurs the bureaucratic expertise of state agencies, and leads to more 
ambitious environmental regulation, while still providing regulatory 
certainty to vehicle manufacturers.252 
California has used its “superregulator” status to drive climate policy at 
the federal level, a prime example of the values of iterative federalism where 
the superregulator state and the federal government spur one another toward 
progress that likely would not occur otherwise.253 Given the benefits of the 
existing dual-regulator system, Congress and the courts should be wary of 
discarding this delicate balance. 
2. Unsuitability of Absolute Ceiling Preemption 
Regulatory ceiling preemption is of particular concern and should 
require stronger justification in the environmental context. There certainly 
are good reasons for setting national standards,254 but the arguments that 
support floor preemption do not necessarily extend to ceiling preemption 
schemes like the vehicle emissions regime. 
 
 250 Carlson, supra note 4, at 314, 317 (“The prospect of fifty separate standards for automobiles is 
untenable.”); Raymond B. Ludwiszewski & Charles H. Haake, Cars, Carbon, and Climate Change, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 665, 682 n.101 (2008) (noting that designing and manufacturing vehicles for specific 
state requirements “entails considerable sunk costs in the form of research and development, and it is 
therefore inefficient for manufacturers to produce such vehicles only for discrete markets”). Indeed, one 
primary justification for enacting the Clean Air Act was to avoid creating inefficiencies in vehicle markets 
if every state was responsible for setting its own emissions limits. COMM. ON STATE PRACTICES IN 
SETTING MOBILE SOURCE EMISSIONS STANDARDS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL 
STANDARDS FOR MOBILE-SOURCE EMISSIONS 2 (2006); see also Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra, at 676. 
 251 As Professor Carlson notes, “[t]he debates about federalism tend to view each of the fifty states 
as identical—either all fifty states are regulating on their own, or they are enlisted as a group to assist the 
federal government in implementing federal law. Yet the fifty states obviously differ in significant 
respects. Only a few possess the economic size, population, and regulatory sophistication of California, 
and only a few, therefore, have the capacity to participate in modified federalism.” Carlson, supra note 
4, at 318. 
 252 See id. at 315–16. 
 253 See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1107, 
1134 (2009) (deeming California a “superregulator”). 
 254 See Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1590–91 (describing the arguments for 
a unitary federal standard). For an argument that the regulation of greenhouse gases specifically should 
remain exclusively with the federal government, see Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 250, at 679–85. 
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As Professors Glicksman and Levy note, in environmental regulation, 
floor preemption commonly prohibits states from setting lower standards 
than the federal requirements, which would clearly constitute a conflict 
under the Supremacy Clause.255 But in the case of state standards that are 
more stringent than the federal requirement, “the more protective state law 
would not hinder the enforcement of the federal standard and would appear 
to further the environmental goals of the federal law.”256 Environmental 
protection goals, however, are not the sole consideration when setting federal 
standards,257 and significantly stricter state laws could indeed frustrate the 
federal scheme because a unitary federal standard is itself part of the policy 
approach.258 
Moreover, courts have been generally deferential to Congress’s 
determination to preempt, and when Congress includes an express 
preemption provision, courts have not been keen to question whether such a 
provision is really justified under the Supremacy Clause.259 Thus, an 
argument that ceiling preemption of state vehicle emissions regulation is not 
justified under the Supremacy Clause is unlikely to succeed. Yet, as noted 
above, there is value in permitting policy and technological experimentation 
by one state as a matter of Congress’s discretion to not apply ceiling 
preemption.260 As Justice Brandeis cautioned in his oft-quoted dissent from 
New State Ice Company v. Liebmann: 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. 
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to 
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.261 
 
 255 Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption 
by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 
583 (2008). 
 256 Id. 
 257 The EPA, for example, must also consider what is technologically feasible, and Congress, of 
course, must consider what is politically palatable. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(5)(B) (2012). 
 258 A critical component of the 2009 compromise between the Obama Administration, the state of 
California, and the major American automakers was that there be a single regulator and a harmonized 
national standard. Mary Beth Houlihan, et al., Commentary, 2009: A Year of Significant CAA 
Developments on All Fronts, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10250, 10252 (2010). 
 259 See Gregory M. Dickinson, Calibrating Chevron for Preemption, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 667, 699 
(2011) (“Where Congress has spoken through an express preemption clause, concerns of federalism, 
expertise, and self-aggrandizement are outweighed by Congress’s expressed intent and Chevron’s 
rationale of agency delegation.”). 
 260 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 311. 
 261 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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Several scholars have written thoughtful analyses of the traditional 
justifications for uniform federal standards and why these justifications do 
not support ceiling preemption in environmental regulation. Specifically, 
they have critiqued four primary arguments for uniform federal standards as 
they apply to environmental regulation: capitalizing on economies of scale, 
avoiding a states’ race to the bottom, reducing interstate externalities, and 
providing regulatory certainty to industry.262 
The first argument is that it is cheaper and more efficient for one unitary 
actor to conduct scientific analyses, determine the optimal level of 
regulation, and administer one uniform set of standards, rather than having 
fifty separate agencies conducting research and setting unique standards.263 
The structure of the Clean Air Act, however, makes the latter outcome 
impossible, as it at most allows two regulators: the federal government and 
the state of California.264 
Second, proponents of unitary federal standards worry that states will 
otherwise engage in a race to the bottom, in which states lower their 
environmental standards to lure businesses and cut costs, causing other states 
to do the same.265 This concern is alleviated by a federal floor, which limits 
the bottom to which states may race. However, the race to the bottom concern 
lends no support for federal ceilings in environmental regulation—states can 
set more stringent environmental standards if they so choose, fully aware that 
it might cause economic costs in the form of lost business within the state.266 
A third justification for centralized federal regulation is that it protects 
interstate relations and trade by prohibiting protectionist state policies and 
cost externalization.267 The concern is that a state may adopt regulatory 
approaches that provide environmental benefits for its own citizens or give 
a competitive advantage to in-state industry while externalizing costs to other 
states. But similar to the foregoing concerns, protectionism is less of a 
problem in the Act’s dual-regulator system.268 California’s vehicle emissions 
standards do not benefit in-state manufacturers or externalize all regulatory 
 
 262 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 4, at 317. See generally Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra 
note 20, at 1600–13 (explaining factors that influence the decision to adopt a uniform federal standard 
through federal preemption). 
 263 See James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System—
And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1230 (1995); Revesz, supra note 143, at 578, 582. 
 264 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 311. 
 265 See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Illusion of Devolution in Environmental Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1003, 
1005 (2006). 
 266 See id.; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 255, at 604, 606. 
 267 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 255, at 603–04. 
 268 See Burgess, supra note 82 (arguing that cost externalization is not a legitimate or sufficient 
justification for ceiling preemption in environmental laws). 
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costs—rather, they evenhandedly impose costs on both in-state and out-of-
state manufacturers and consumers who purchase cars in California. There 
undoubtedly are some externalized costs to consumers outside of California 
in the marginal increase in vehicle cost that results from reduced economies 
of scale in vehicle production (when manufacturers must meet two standards 
rather than one), but California consumers bear the greatest brunt of these 
costs as they must purchase lower-emissions, higher-cost cars than the 
national market, indicating that it is not a protectionist policy.269 
The last argument for a unitary federal standard—providing regulatory 
certainty to industry—does apply to vehicle emissions, as the automotive 
industry unsurprisingly prefers to abide by one, lower national standard.270 
But, as Professor Buzbee notes, “the actual federal track record has been one 
of backpedaling and half measures,” and for “high-volume, widely marketed 
products like cars, allowing at least the limited diversity of two approaches 
could serve as an incentive for innovation and an antidote to inertia and 
outdated or lax regulation.”271 Moreover, California’s separate standard may 
itself be a source of regulatory certainty when the federal standards oscillate 
with presidential administrations,272 perhaps evidenced by the fact that some 
vehicle manufacturers are now voluntarily adhering to California’s 
requirements while the enforceability of the SAFE Rule remains uncertain.273 
Thus, the traditional justifications for unitary federal standards do not 
sufficiently necessitate a ceiling for vehicle emissions regulations. As 
Professor Buzbee summarized, “the GHG and climate-change problem is 
one particularly well suited to federal floors and not to unitary federal choice 
ceilings,” and “floor preemption’s institutional diversity may create a better 
chance of success.”274 
CONCLUSION 
 California will continue fighting for the ability to maintain its more 
stringent vehicle emissions standards, particularly as the federal standards 
roll back. With the EPA’s issuance of part one of the SAFE Rule in final 
form,275 litigation is moving forward to challenge the revocation California’s 
 
 269 See Revesz, supra note 143, at 593. 
 270 Carlson, supra note 4, at 310. 
 271 Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1617–19. 
 272 See supra Sections II.B–II.C. 
 273 David Shepardson, U.S. Moving to Block California Vehicle Emissions Rule, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 
2019, 11:07 A.M.), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-emissions-california/us-moving-to-block-
california-vehicle-emissions-rules-idUSKCN1VQ24M [https://perma.cc/XCR2-PPC8]. 
 274 Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1592, 1618. 
 275 The SAFE Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533). 
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waiver.276 Car manufacturers are also choosing sides: Ford, BMW, Honda, 
and Volkswagen agreed to a deal with California to comply with the more 
stringent, pre-rollback standards with a one year delay extending to 2026,277 
while General Motors, Fiat Chrysler, and Toyota agreed to intervene on 
behalf of the Trump Administration.278 While most of the legal battle going 
forward will likely focus on the procedural sufficiency and substantive 
merits of the standards freeze and waiver revocation, there is also an 
important opportunity to consider this conflict as a study in federalism. 
Under the Court’s current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence post-
Murphy, which leaves preemption as an exception to the anticommandeering 
prohibition, it is unlikely that California can invoke federalism arguments to 
challenge the loss of its ability to set more stringent standards. But Murphy’s 
dividing line between permissible preemption and unconstitutional 
commandeering may not be satisfactory for complex cooperative federalism 
regimes like the Clean Air Act, where Congress deliberately offers states a 
role to participate in jointly regulating private actors. 
Aside from constitutional limits, the system of having two regulators 
has worked well for the last fifty years, spurring immense technological 
innovation and significantly reducing pollution and GHG emissions.279 
Recognizing the traditional role that California has played as a laboratory of 
democracy driving environmental protection, vehicle emissions regulation 
may be the very area where inviting dual, cooperative regulation, not ceiling 
preemption, makes sense. 
  
 
 276 Complaint, California v. Chao, supra note 14. 
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